56. Fear Of Ceasing To Be

The lie that exalts us is dearer than a thousand sober truths. 

Alexander Pushkin 

The fear that death is the terminus of individual existence motivates a wide range of ideationally inconsistent models. These include the belief that humans are a separate creation from the rest of life — not least because it is very easy to believe that other organisms, such as fish, grass and bacteria do not proceed to a new life after death.

This fear is especially evident in models of mind and consciousness that are largely consistent with older concepts such as soul and spirit. On the one hand, mind and consciousness are used to demarcate a dividing line between humans and other species. On the other hand, by modelling mind and consciousness as things, it is possible to model them as composed of an immaterial substance which is not subject to material death.

This fear is understandably deep, since animals with a high value for self-preservation are more likely to survive and reproduce than animals without. Natural selection would favour any genes whose expression contributed to such a basic value, and the value has been a powerful selector of the types of models that have evolved from prehistoric times.

ChatGPT revised:

The Fear of Death and Its Influence on Human Models

The lie that exalts us is dearer than a thousand sober truths. (Alexander Pushkin)

The fear that death marks the terminus of individual existence has given rise to a wide range of ideationally inconsistent models. One of the most enduring of these is the belief that humans are a separate creation from the rest of life. This belief is particularly persuasive because it is easy to accept that organisms like fish, grass, and bacteria do not proceed to some form of new life after death, while humans might.

This fear is especially prevalent in models of mind and consciousness that align with older concepts such as the soul and spirit. On one hand, mind and consciousness are often invoked to demarcate a line between humans and other species. On the other hand, by modelling these phenomena as things or substances, it becomes possible to argue that they are composed of an immaterial substance that is not subject to material death.

The depth of this fear is understandable. Organisms with a strong value for self-preservation are more likely to survive and reproduce than those without such a drive. Natural selection favours genes whose expression contributes to this fundamental value, and this drive for self-preservation has been a powerful selector of the types of models of humanity that have evolved, from prehistoric times to the present day.

55. Fear Of Being “Reduced”

Results without causes are much more impressive.[1]

The practice of analysing complex phenomena in terms of their parts risks the interpretation that such phenomena are ‘nothing but’ those parts. This erroneous interpretation is most explicitly signalled by the use of words such as ‘just’ ‘only’ ‘merely’ or ‘simply’. Grammatically, these words function as mood adjuncts of intensity: subcategory counterexpectancy: subcategory limiting. That is, their meaning is ‘contrary to expectations, the phenomenon is limited to x’. So, when applied to construals of humanity, these meanings trigger the fear that despite what anyone thinks, humans are limited to anatomy, chemicals, atoms. or whatever. As argued here, the constituency model is limited to static structures and, because of this, is insufficient to deal with organisations that emerge dynamically through the interaction, and which therefore cannot be understood solely in terms of constituents. 

The covert assumption that makes this misinterpretation threatening is the false belief that lower levels of organisation are somehow more “real” or “true” that higher levels — a view that can be held by both proponents and opponents of reductionist thinking. However, lower level models are not more “real”. Like all models, they are semiotic descriptions, and distinct from what is being modelled. Lower level models are (just only merely simply) more self-consistent — and so more reliable — than higher level models, and this is because they describe simpler systems, and therefore require less time to evolve in the history of modelling. 

This fear is related to the fear that any model of a phenomenon reduces it to that explanatory description.[2] (Again, this is to confuse what can be modelled with the model of it.) The reduction of ignorance is misconstrued as the reduction of value.[3] This assumption equates positive value with ignorance. Positively valued ignorance is called ‘mystery’. 

Footnotes:

[1] Sherlock Holmes in The Stockbroker’s Clerk by Conan Doyle.

[2] This is related to the fear of being uninteresting. As Hofstadter (1980: 621) observes: 

This is, it seems to me, a general principle: you get bored with something not when you have exhausted its repertoire of behaviour, but when you have mapped out the limits of the space that contains its behaviour. 

[3] Humanity modelled is not humanity explained away.

ChatGPT revised:

The Danger of Reductionism and the Fear of Simplification

Results without causes are much more impressive (Sherlock Holmes, The Stockbroker’s Clerk).

The practice of analysing complex phenomena by breaking them down into their individual parts risks the interpretation that these phenomena are ‘nothing but’ the sum of those parts. This reductionist interpretation is often signalled by the use of words such as ‘just’, ‘only’, ‘merely’, or ‘simply’. Grammatically, these words function as mood adjuncts of intensity, specifically within the category of counterexpectancy and limiting. Their meaning is essentially: “contrary to expectations, the phenomenon is limited to x”.

When these terms are applied to construals of humanity, they evoke a fear that, despite any theoretical or emotional assertions, humans are limited to their anatomical, chemical, or atomic components. As argued earlier, the constituency model (which breaks down systems into parts) is limited by its static nature and is insufficient for understanding dynamic systems—systems that emerge through interaction and cannot be fully understood merely by looking at their parts.

The covert assumption driving this misinterpretation is the false belief that lower levels of organisation (e.g., biological or chemical components) are somehow more “real” or “true” than higher levels of organisation (such as psychological or social phenomena). This view is held both by proponents and opponents of reductionist thinking. However, lower-level models are not more “real”. Like all models, they are semiotic representations, distinct from the phenomena they aim to describe.

Lower-level models are more self-consistent and reliable simply because they describe simpler systems, which are easier to represent and require less time to evolve in the history of modelling.

This fear of simplification is closely tied to the concern that any model of a phenomenon reduces it to that explanation. This confusion between the phenomenon itself and the model of it leads to the erroneous belief that reducing ignorance is equivalent to reducing value. In this framework, the positive value of a model is often seen as linked to the mystery it maintains.

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54. Values Affecting Construals Of Humanity

As argued previously, ideational construals, including the interpretations of experiments, are selected according to their fit with the interpersonal values of the community doing the modelling. Many complementary fears/desires motivate the sorts of models of humanity that are both generated, and then selected for or against by a community. The common motif among them is the fear that humanity is unimportant, not special, the desire for humanity to be important, special. A covert assumption is that values such as ‘important’ or ‘special’ are absolute/objective/real, rather than imposed by the humans involved.

ChatGPT revised:

Ideational Construals and the Influence of Interpersonal Values

As argued previously, ideational construals, including the interpretations of experiments, are selected based on how well they align with the interpersonal values of the community engaging in the modelling process. These models are not purely objective; rather, they are motivated by a complex interplay of complementary fears and desires. At the heart of this is a pervasive fear that humanity is unimportant, not special, and a desire for humanity to be important and special.

A covert assumption that underpins these models is the belief that values such as ‘important’ and ‘special’ are absolute, objective, or real, rather than being imposed by the humans involved in creating and selecting these models. This assumption, often left unexamined, shapes the kinds of narratives and models that emerge in various communities, influencing both how humans see themselves and how they interpret the world around them.

57. Fear Of Lack Of Self-Determination

The experiments of Libet (2004), which showed that neural activity associated with a decision precedes awareness of the decision, have been widely interpreted as challenging the notion of free will. The covert assumption here is that consciousness equates with the self or person, and so if the person is the chooser, then consciousness is the chooser. But the capacity to choose does not depend on consciousness doing the choosing. As argued here, it is more ideationally consistent to say that it is the whole system in context that chooses. Consciousness is the monitoring of a small subset of the selecting. Consciousness and decision-making are distinct phenomena, and ‘unconscious’ decisions are decisions nonetheless. 

The values that have motivated humans to see consciousness as the agent of behaviour, as the controller rather than as the monitoring of personal experience, include the desire to see individual humans as self-determined, and the complementary fear that humans might be more determined rather than determining. 

This fear came to the fore in the rejection of Behaviourism, the construal of ‘externally observable behavioural responses as functions of environmental stimuli’, with ‘mental states either ignored or redefined in stimulus–response terms’.[1] In the 1930s and 1940s, the experiments of Skinner demonstrated how rewards and punishments shape behaviour, challenging the notion of free will.[2] As Boden (1995: 149) put it, Skinner’s behaviourism implied that “the environment”, not “autonomous man” is in control (Skinner 1971: 21). By contrast, the model of behaviour presented here locates the rôle of reward and punishment within a larger perspective of choice and biological–semiotic co-evolution, elucidating some of the dimensions excluded by behaviourist models. 

The unqualified belief that humans[3] have the “power” to choose freely serves an interpersonal function. By construing individuals as agents of their own behaviour, it fixes moral responsibility with the individual. On the one hand, this contributes to social stability, since agents of disorder can be identified and removed from society. But, on the other hand, it blames unequal individuals equally, and absolves the community from being responsible for those who “choose” to fail. 

Footnotes:

[1] Macquarie Dictionary (1992: 157).

[2] See, for example, Slater (2004).

[3] Legal systems typically qualify this to adults “of sound mind”.

ChatGPT revised:

The Problem of Free Will and the Influence of Consciousness

The experiments of Libet (2004), which demonstrated that neural activity associated with a decision precedes awareness of the decision, have often been interpreted as challenging the notion of free will. The covert assumption here is that consciousness equates with the self or person. In this view, if the person is the chooser, then consciousness is the chooser. However, the capacity to choose does not rely on consciousness performing the act of choosing. As argued here, it is more ideationally consistent to say that it is the whole system in context that chooses, and that consciousness merely monitors a small subset of that selecting process. Consciousness and decision-making are distinct phenomena, and unconscious decisions are still decisions.

The values motivating the perception of consciousness as the agent of behaviour — as the controller rather than as the monitor of personal experience — stem from the desire to see humans as self-determined, and the complementary fear that humans might instead be more determined than determining.

This fear surfaced prominently with the rejection of Behaviourism, which viewed externally observable behavioural responses as functions of environmental stimuli, with mental states either ignored or redefined in stimulus–response terms (Macquarie Dictionary, 1992). In the 1930s and 1940s, Skinner’s experiments demonstrated how rewards and punishments shape behaviour, challenging the idea of free will. As Boden (1995: 149) noted, Skinner’s behaviourism implied that “the environment,” not “autonomous man,” is in control (Skinner, 1971: 21). By contrast, the model of behaviour presented here locates the role of rewards and punishments within a broader context of choice and biological–semiotic co-evolution, addressing some dimensions excluded by behaviourist models.

The unqualified belief that humans possess the “power” to choose freely serves an interpersonal function. By portraying individuals as the agents of their own behaviour, this belief fixes moral responsibility with the individual. On one hand, this contributes to social stability, as agents of disorder can be identified and removed from society. On the other hand, it places the blame equally on individuals for their failures, absolving the broader community from responsibility for those who “choose” to fail.