Construals of causation in the biological sciences can be usefully examined in terms of the logico-semantic relation of cause — reason, result and purpose — on the one hand, and in terms of the ergative function of agency — participant as cause — on the other.
(1) Cause: Reason, Result And Purpose
One source of ideational inconsistency in biology is the failure to distinguish different types of causal relations: reason, result and purpose.
[1] Reason and result can be generalised as
because reason P so result Q, whereas purpose can be generalised as
because intention P so action Q.
A frequent example of reason and result being construed as purpose can be generalised as phenotypic trait X evolved in order to Y; for instance, eyes evolved in order to improve animals survival prospects. An alternative construal, one that is ideationally consistent with evolutionary theory, would be phenotypic trait X evolved because Y: eyes evolved because they improved animals survival prospects.
A similar case is the construal of evolutionary reason and result as behavioural purpose, which can be schematised as animal X does Y in order to pass on its genes. An alternative construal, one that is ideationally consistent with evolutionary theory, would be animal X doing Y can result in its genes being passed on. Animals do not act in order to propagate their genes. Rather, animals act in order to achieve multifarious ends across a range of multifarious contexts, and some of these actions can result in the propagation of their genes.
The distinction between reason and result and purpose is not a trivial one, epistemologically, and deep ideational consistencies can follow from the failure to make it. These can range from misunderstandings of the respective rôles of variation and selection, and the relation between the two, to the belief that “the purpose” of organisms is the passing on of genes. Note, incidentally, that this is ideationally distinct from organisms being a means by which genes replicate themselves, or genes being the means by which organisms reproduce themselves, both of which are instances of manner rather than cause.
(2) Cause As Participant: Agency
In terms of ergativity, an agent is a participant that is the external cause of a process, while a medium is a participant through which a process is actualised. As participants in
evolutionary processes, genes are the
medium of variation and selection processes, not the agent of variation and selection processes. Genes are the participants through which variation and selection are actualised; they are not the external causes of variation and selection. Construing genes as agents of evolution is ideationally inconsistent with biological theory.
[2]
Incidentally, it might be added here that construing biological taxa as the agents of their own evolution, as in clauses like
amphibians evolved eardrums or
humans evolved big brains is similarly ideationally inconsistent with biological theory.
[3] Biological taxa are the media through which evolutionary change is actualised.
As participants in developmental processes, genes function as both agent and medium in cycles of expressing and activating. That is, genes are the external cause of amino acid formation, for example, but the chemical environment is the external cause of the selective activation of genes in that process.
Similarly, to construe genes as self-replicators
[4] is to construe them as the agents of their own replication, whereas they are the medium through which the replication is actualised. The external cause, the agent of gene replication, is the chemical environment that either initiates the process or maintains the status quo.
Footnotes:
[1] It is also useful to distinguish ‘purpose’ from the more general notion of ‘telos’, or ‘ends’. Previously established processes, such as those of biological development, have ends that the system in question moves towards. This is a more general meaning than ‘purpose’, which might be best rstricted to describing behaviours directed at satisfying value disequilibria. That is, development has ends, behaviour has ends that are purposes, and evolution, being open and contingent, has neither purpose nor ends.
[2] Construing
selection metaphorically as the agent of evolution conceals the congruent agent causing the selecting.
[3] Typical, not only in science journalism, is the following, which combines ‘species as the agent of evolution’ with ‘evolution as purposeful’: ‘Dr Brennan believes [mallard]
females evolved convoluted oviducts to foil the male rapists.’ [Maggie Fox, Reuters, SMH 2/5/07]
[4] Note also the Agentive suffix
–or.
ChatGPT revised:
Construals of Causation in the Biological Sciences
Causal construals in the biological sciences can be productively analysed in terms of two distinct yet complementary systems: the logico-semantic relation of cause — encompassing reason, result, and purpose — and the ergative structure of agency, in which a participant functions as the cause of a process.
(1) Cause: Reason, Result, and Purpose
One persistent source of ideational inconsistency in biology is the failure to distinguish between different types of causal relation:
A common conflation occurs when reason and result are construed as purpose — e.g. trait X evolved in order to Y, such as eyes evolved in order to improve survival. This construal attributes purpose to evolution, when the ideationally consistent alternative is eyes evolved because they improved survival prospects — a result, not a purpose.
A similar misstep occurs when evolutionary result is reinterpreted as behavioural purpose — e.g. animal X does Y in order to pass on its genes. This frames gene propagation as an intended goal. But a more accurate construal is: animal X doing Y can result in its genes being passed on. Animals act for a range of immediate purposes; some of these may have the downstream result of gene propagation.
The distinction is epistemologically significant. The conflation of result with purpose underwrites widespread misconceptions — from confusion over the roles of variation and selection, to the belief that organisms exist in order to pass on their genes. Notably, this differs from construing organisms as the means by which genes replicate themselves, or vice versa — which are instances of manner, not cause.
(2) Cause as Participant: Agency
In ergative terms, an agent is the external cause of a process, while a medium is the participant through which the process unfolds. Within evolutionary processes, genes are media, not agents. They are the participants through which variation and selection are actualised — not the external causes of those processes. To construe genes as the agents of evolution is therefore ideationally inconsistent with biological theory.[²]
Similarly, to construe biological taxa as agents of their own evolution — e.g. amphibians evolved eardrums, humans evolved big brains — is equally inconsistent. Taxa are media, not agents, of evolutionary change.[³]
In developmental processes, by contrast, genes may function both as agent and medium in recursive cycles of expression and activation. Genes may be the external cause of, for example, amino acid formation. But the chemical environment is the agent of selective gene activation — determining which genes are expressed and when.
Finally, construing genes as self-replicators implies they are agents of their own replication. But in congruent terms, genes are the medium of replication; the agent is the chemical environment that initiates and sustains the replication process. This is further signalled by the agentive suffix -or, as in replicator.[⁴]
Footnotes:
[1] It is useful to distinguish purpose from the broader notion of telos or ends. Developmental processes have ends — states the system tends towards. Purpose, however, might be best restricted to behaviour aimed at resolving value disequilibria. Development has ends; behaviour has purposeful ends; evolution, being open and contingent, has neither ends nor purpose.
[2] Treating selection metaphorically as an agent of evolution conceals the congruent agent that causes the selecting.
[3] For example: “Dr Brennan believes [mallard] females evolved convoluted oviducts to foil the male rapists” (Maggie Fox, Reuters, Sydney Morning Herald, 2/5/07). This conflates species-as-agent with evolution-as-purposeful.
[4] Note the semantic significance of the agentive suffix –or.