The term ‘fact’ is a label for a model or proposition whose ideational consistency is regarded as certain by an individual or community.
[1] That is, the term ‘fact’ expresses an
interpersonal stance toward an ideational construal. Similarly, the expression ‘just a theory’ is a label for a model whose ideational consistency is regarded as less certain by an individual or community. The scale of certainty is a dimension within the interpersonal system of modalisation: the semantic space between ‘yes’ and ‘no’ (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 616-25).
On the other hand, the term ‘dogma’ is a label for a model or proposition whose ideational consistency is regarded as obligatory by an individual or community. The scale of obligation is a dimension within the interpersonal system of modulation: the semantic space between ‘do!’ and ‘don’t’ (ibid). Importantly, terms like ‘fact’, ‘only a theory’ and ‘dogma’ express a relation between a model or proposition and an individual or community.
The terms ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ similarly express an interpersonal orientation toward metafunctional consistency. Objective and subjective are ways of
presenting propositions.
[2] To present a proposition as ‘objective’ or ‘value-free’ or ‘reality’ is a
value-laden claim about the proposition — the subjectivity sometimes disguised by being in tune with the shared values of a community — the interpersonal function of which is to remove the negotiability of the proposition.
Footnotes:
[1] Since facts are what we are certain of, they are propositions we believe to be true.
[2] The subjective or objective orientations may be expressed explicitly or implicitly.
ChatGPT revised:
Interpersonal Stances Toward Models
The term ‘fact’ is an interpersonal label applied to a model or proposition whose ideational consistency is treated as certain by an individual or community.1 That is, ‘fact’ marks a stance toward a construal of experience, locating the construal at the high-certainty end of the modalisation scale — the semantic space between ‘yes’ and ‘no’ (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 616–25). Similarly, the expression ‘just a theory’ positions a construal toward the lower-certainty end of this same scale.
By contrast, the label ‘dogma’ marks a proposition as carrying interpersonal obligation rather than certainty. Here, the interpersonal system is modulation — the semantic space between ‘do!’ and ‘don’t’. To call something a dogma is to say that its acceptance is required within a particular social or ideological formation. Terms such as ‘fact’, ‘only a theory’, and ‘dogma’ do not describe propositions in themselves but position them in relation to a community or individual.
Likewise, the terms ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ construe an interpersonal orientation to a proposition’s metafunctional consistency. They are ways of presenting meanings. Labelling a construal as ‘objective’, ‘value-free’, or ‘real’ is itself a value-laden move: it often serves to reduce negotiability and to present a proposition as settled. The apparent objectivity may stem from alignment with shared community values, and is often misrecognised as neutrality. Subjective and objective orientations may be made explicit or implicit, but both operate within the interpersonal system of appraisal.