46. Mind As Brain Process

The thoughts themselves are the thinker. 

William James 

One of many[1] impediments to modelling the mind in an ideationally consistent way is the simple fact that the word ‘mind’, like ‘fire’ and ‘life’, is a noun. Nouns construe experience as things, whether concrete or abstract.[2] Construing fire, life and mind as things entails construing them as composed as substances. In failing to detect the substances of fire and life, ideationally-consistent models emerged only when they were instead construed as processes. In failing to detect the substance of mind, the substance has been construed as immaterial, and so beyond the range of empirical scientific modelling.[3]

An alternative way to model mind, with the promise of doing so in an ideationally consistent way, is to construe it as a process. This is to construe the brain as the material medium of the “mind” process, and the mind as a function of the brain as physiological system, in the same way that digestion is a function of the alimentary canal as physiological system. However, the brain alone is insufficient to understand the process labelled ‘mind’ if the brain functions as an evolutionary system which adapts to the rest of the body and to the contextual environment in which the body is required to function. Further, the contextual environment to which brain functions adapt includes other bodies whose behaviours express the potentials of brains embedded within them, and through which brain functions adapt to one another. 

Footnotes:

[1] Another impediment to modelling the mind in an ideationally consistent way is the high interpersonal value placed on surviving death.

[2] Nouns that are obviously derived from verbs, such as ‘formation’, construe a process as the congruent construal, but words like ‘fire’, ‘life’ and ‘mind’ display no hint of such a construal.

[3] This construal of mind is largely consistent with the religious notion of soul.

ChatGPT revised:

“The thoughts themselves are the thinker.” — William James

One of the key challenges in modelling the mind in an ideationally consistent way is the fact that the word “mind,” like “fire” and “life,” is a noun. Nouns construe experience as things, whether concrete or abstract. By treating fire, life, and mind as things, we implicitly treat them as substances. However, fire and life are not substances in the traditional sense. Ideationally consistent models only emerged when these concepts were reframed as processes rather than substances. Similarly, the failure to recognize the substance of mind has led to the misconception of it as immaterial, placing it beyond the reach of empirical scientific modelling.

An alternative and ideationally consistent approach to modelling the mind is to treat it as a process. In this model, the brain serves as the material medium for the “mind” process, and the mind itself is understood as a function of the brain, much like digestion is a function of the alimentary canal. However, the brain alone is insufficient to explain the mind. The brain functions as part of an evolutionary system that adapts not only to the rest of the body but also to the contextual environment in which the body must function. Furthermore, the contextual environment to which the brain adapts includes other bodies whose behaviours express the potentials of brains embedded within them, and through these interactions, brain functions adapt to one another.

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Footnotes:

1. Impediments to Modelling the Mind: Another challenge to modelling the mind ideationally is the significant interpersonal value placed on surviving death. This creates psychological and social pressures that influence how the mind is conceptualized.

2. Nouns Derived from Verbs: Nouns that are clearly derived from verbs, such as “formation,” are typically construed as processes. However, words like “fire,” “life,” and “mind” do not inherently suggest such a process-based interpretation, which complicates our understanding of them.

3. Mind as Soul: The traditional view of the mind as immaterial is often aligned with the religious concept of the soul, a notion that remains largely resistant to empirical modelling.

48. Person As Social-Semiotic Process

Whereas ‘consciousness’ is construed above as a process going on in neurological systems, ‘person’ is construed here as a process going on in social systems. On this model, a person is not a thing, material or immaterial; a person is a social-semiotic process. A person is a function of each socially-situated body[1] with a semiotised brain: a local process in a more global web of interacting local processes.[2] The biological processes of each body in a social system function as the medium of persons-as-processes, but it is social-semiotic interaction that differentiates persons as individuals.[3]

As social-semiotic processes, persons happen at the three timescales of logogenesis, ontogenesis and phylogenesis. Logogenetically, a person is the process of making meaning in a range of types of social situation. Ontogenetically, a person is a process of creating and evolving a range of situation-specific types of meaning potentials (registers) in a developing and aging body. That is, ontogenetically, a person is a continuous, developmentally-timed adapting of semiotic potential to the range of social situation types experienced in a lifetime. Phylogenetically, a person is a suite of processes that occurs in a particular time-interval in the co-evolution of the specific semiotic system and biological species. Meanings reproduce through humans; human being includes the experiencing of that process and the monitoring of the experiencing. 

The individuated differentiation of persons relates to each person being a unique history of interactions. As an evolution in development in social contexts, each person is one set of trajectories in the state space that represents all possible ontogenetic trajectories.[4] The valeur of each person as an individual lies in how each contrasts with other interactants in the social system. Accordingly, individual identity varies with social relations, such that each individual potentially has as many different identities as they have different social relations. The identity of each person depends on the relation between them and those with whom they interact; a person functions as different identities to different people. So a social system isn’t just the integration of different persons, it is the integration of the different identities of different persons. 

The process perspective construes ‘beings’ as ‘becomings’: as continuous creation, re-creation and transformation. As processes, persons start and stop. When a person starts, a new semiotic universe begins; when a person stops, a semiotic universe ends. Semiotic universes are continually and continuously starting and stopping. When a person begins interacting with another, a new identity begins to emerge; when a person ceases interacting with another, an old identity begins to fade away. 

Because persons are processes, time is the dimension of personhood, of experiencing. But it is not that persons experience time and space; rather time and space are the dimensions of experiencing. Time and space are the frame of reference — a four-dimensional grid that is the measure of difference — in which persons experience difference.

Footnotes:

[1] According to Sartre, the self emerges in the construing of ourselves as an item in someone else’s world. For Ramachandran, our model of self is our model of others applied to ourselves.

[2] This could also be construed as: body as form, person as social function.

[3] A person can be distinguished from an organism in the following way: a social system is a level of organisation supervenient on persons — social beings — defined by the roles they play in the social system; an organism is a level of organisation supervenient on organs defined by the roles they play in the somatic system.

[4] Persons with sufficient autonomy to choose the range of environments that they experience — and which variants — have the opportunity to contribute more directly to their own individuation.

ChatGPT revised:

"Person" — unlike consciousness, which is construed as a process within neurological systems, is understood here as a process within social systems. On this model, a person is not a thing, whether material or immaterial, but a social-semiotic process. A person is a function of each socially-situated body, with a semiotised brain, embedded in a larger web of interacting local processes. The biological processes of the body in a social system serve as the medium for persons-as-processes, but it is through social-semiotic interaction that persons are differentiated as individuals.

As social-semiotic processes, persons unfold at the three timescales of logogenesis, ontogenesis, and phylogenesis:

1. Logogenetically, a person is the process of meaning-making in a range of social situations.

2. Ontogenetically, a person is the process of creating and evolving different situation-specific meaning potentials (registers) in a developing and aging body. In this sense, a person is an ongoing, developmentally-timed adaptation of semiotic potential to the social situations encountered throughout life.

3. Phylogenetically, a person is a suite of processes that occurs within a specific time interval in the co-evolution of semiotic systems and biological species. Meanings are reproduced through humans; human existence involves both the experiencing of this process and the monitoring of that experiencing.

The individuated differentiation of persons arises from their unique histories of interaction. As an evolving development in social contexts, each person represents one set of trajectories within the state space of all possible ontogenetic paths. The valeur of each person, as an individual, lies in their contrast with other interactants in the social system. Thus, individual identity is not fixed; it varies with the social relations in which a person is involved. Each individual potentially has as many identities as they have different social relations. A person functions as a different identity for each person they interact with, meaning that a social system is not just the integration of persons, but the integration of the different identities those persons assume.

The process perspective shifts our view of beings into becoming: continuous creation, re-creation, and transformation. As processes, persons are not static; they start and stop. When a person begins, a new semiotic universe begins; when a person ceases, that semiotic universe ends. These semiotic universes are constantly starting and stopping. When a person begins interacting with another, a new identity emerges; when interaction ceases, an old identity fades away.

Because persons are processes, time becomes the dimension of personhood — the dimension of experiencing. But it is not that persons experience time and space; rather, time and space are the dimensions of experiencing. Time and space serve as the frame of reference — a four-dimensional grid that measures difference — within which persons experience difference.

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Footnotes:

1. Sartre’s View: Sartre suggests that the self emerges through our perception of ourselves as items within someone else’s world. Ramachandran extends this idea, proposing that our model of the self is essentially an application of our model of others to ourselves.

2. Body as Form, Person as Social Function: This could also be understood as the body being a form and the person being a social function.

3. Distinction between Person and Organism: A person can be distinguished from an organism in that a social system is a level of organisation that supervenes on persons — social beings defined by their roles within that system. An organism, in contrast, is a level of organisation that supervenes on organs, defined by the roles these organs play in the somatic system.

4. Autonomy and Individuation: Persons with sufficient autonomy, in terms of choosing the range of environments they experience, have the opportunity to directly influence their own individuation by shaping the variants of social situations they encounter.

47. Consciousness As Monitoring Process

As with mind, one impediment to modelling consciousness in an ideationally consistent way is the simple fact that the word ‘consciousness’ is a noun — in this case a noun derived from an adjective.[1] This construes it as an abstract thing: a property or state of an entity. Again, an alternative way to model consciousness, with the promise of doing so in an ideationally consistent way, is to construe it as a process. But, whereas ‘mind’ refers to the totality of processes mediated by the brain, ‘consciousness’ only refers to some of those processes. 

As a process, consciousness can be understood as the moment by moment focused recognition of current recognition activity: a monitoring of the system by the system.[2] The recursive nature of the process means that this recognition of the current recognition processes can itself be what is being recognised by the system from moment to moment. This allows not only the monitoring of current experiencing, including remembering and imagining, but also metamonitoring: monitoring of the monitoring process itself. 

The complexity of consciousness correlates with the complexity of the systems being recognised in the process.[3] That is, consciousness involves the monitoring of different types of recognition processes, rather than different types of monitoring.[4] Some of the dimensions of this complexity have been sketched in previous chapters, but a few can be recapitulated here. 

(1) the number of functional levels in the neurological system as recognition system: the perceptual recognition of sensory difference and the supervenient conceptual recognition of such perceptual differences. 

(2) the differentiation of these levels of organisation into types of behavioural potentials: non-semiotic and semiotic (linguistic and non-linguistic). 

(3) the differentiation of these types into context-specific registers.[5]

(4) the three timescales of semiotic processes: logogenesis, ontogenesis and phylogenesis. 

(5) the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes: each moment involves the selection[6] of some activations, the valeur of which depends on the contrastive options not selected, and the sequencing of choices is nonlinear, such that small differences in starting positions can lead to disproportional differences in trajectories and endpoints. 

(6) the metafunctional dimensions of semiotic dynamics: the (textual) grading, focusing and directing of attention to the (ideational) construals motivated by (interpersonal) values. 

Because consciousness is a monitoring process, it is not the decision maker of behaviour.[7] Decisions — selections — are made by the whole system, which includes the process of consciousness, in context. Consciousness is the monitoring of the choosing process, and it potentially provides feedback to the system as a whole, altering the probabilities of future selection events. Conscious decisions are decisions that are monitored in the process of consciousness; they are not selected by consciousness. Consciousness does not make decisions. This is demonstrated by the experiments of Libet (2004) that show that the neural events of decision-making occur before the subject is aware of the decision being made. 

Footnotes:

[1] Grammatically, ‘consciousness’ might be seen as a nominalisation of the clause ‘being conscious’.

[2] So-called ‘loss of consciousness’ can be either the cessation of the monitoring process, as in blindsight, or the cessation of the processes being monitored, as in the cessation of visual perception during sleep.

[3] This follows from the Jamesian insight that consciousness involves both the process and the phenomenon.

[4] That is, the Jamesian notion of ‘types of conscious states’ is re-formulated here as ‘consciousness of types of states’.

[5] There is also the positions of each individual in the multiple webs of interconnectivity in the hierarchical organisation of social systems which correlates with which registers an individual has access to. This will be discussed under ‘person’, below.

[6] Denton (1993: 6):

Henry James, the distinguished American writer, expressed the view concerning exercise of options as ‘mind being a theatre of simultaneous possibilities — the selection of some and suppression of the rest’…

[7] Boden (1995: 157) cites evidence that conscious thoughts are less relevant to our autonomy than we think, and notes neuroscientists’ doubts as to whether conscious intentions actually direct behaviour. The experiments of Libet (2004) demonstrate that neural activity associated with a decision precedes awareness of the decision.

ChatGPT revised:

“Consciousness” — like "mind" — is a noun. More specifically, it’s a noun derived from an adjective, which leads to the same issue in modelling as with the concept of mind: it is construed as an abstract thing, a property or state of an entity. To model consciousness in an ideationally consistent way, we must consider it not as a thing but as a process. However, unlike "mind," which refers to the totality of processes mediated by the brain, "consciousness" only refers to a subset of those processes.

As a process, consciousness can be understood as the moment-to-moment focused recognition of ongoing recognition activity — a self-monitoring of the system by the system. This recursive nature allows the system to not only monitor its current experiences (including remembering and imagining) but also to engage in metamonitoring, or the monitoring of the monitoring process itself.

The complexity of consciousness correlates with the complexity of the systems being recognised in this process. That is, consciousness involves the monitoring of various types of recognition processes, not different types of monitoring. Some aspects of this complexity were sketched out in earlier chapters, but a few can be revisited here:

1. Functional Levels of the Neurological System: Consciousness involves the recognition of sensory differences and the supervenient conceptual recognition of those differences.

2. Differentiation into Behavioural Potentials: These levels of recognition are differentiated into non-semiotic and semiotic (both linguistic and non-linguistic) behavioural potentials.

3. Context-Specific Registers: These behavioural potentials are further differentiated into context-specific registers, influenced by the system’s environment.

4. Three Timescales of Semiotic Processes: These include logogenesis (the emergence of linguistic meaning), ontogenesis (individual development), and phylogenesis (evolutionary development).

5. Paradigmatic and Syntagmatic Axes: Each moment involves the selection of certain activations, the valeur of which depends on the contrastive options not selected. The sequencing of choices is nonlinear, meaning that small initial differences can lead to disproportionately large differences in outcomes.

6. Metafunctional Dimensions of Semiotic Dynamics: Consciousness involves the grading, focusing, and directing of attention to ideational construals, motivated by interpersonal values.

Because consciousness is a monitoring process, it does not make decisions or select behaviours. The entire system, including the process of consciousness, makes decisions in context. Consciousness monitors this decision-making process and provides feedback, potentially altering the probabilities of future selections. Conscious decisions are those that are monitored during the process of consciousness, but they are not directly made by consciousness itself. This distinction is supported by Libet’s (2004) experiments, which show that neural events related to decision-making occur before the individual becomes aware of the decision.

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Footnotes:

1. Grammatical Insights: Grammatically, “consciousness” can be seen as a nominalisation of the clause "being conscious," reinforcing the idea of it as a state or thing rather than a process.

2. Loss of Consciousness: "Loss of consciousness" can occur in two ways: the cessation of the monitoring process (e.g., blindsight) or the cessation of the processes being monitored (e.g., the cessation of visual perception during sleep).

3. Jamesian Insight: This follows from William James’ insight that consciousness involves both the process of recognition and the phenomenon of being aware of it.

4. Jamesian Notion: James’ concept of “types of conscious states” is reformulated here as “consciousness of types of states,” focusing on the awareness of different mental states.

5. Contextual Registers: The access to different registers of meaning depends on an individual’s position within the hierarchical organisation of social systems, which influences the registers they have access to. This will be discussed under ‘person’ below.

6. Mind as Theatre of Simultaneous Possibilities: Denton (1993: 6) cites Henry James’ idea of the mind as a “theatre of simultaneous possibilities — the selection of some and suppression of the rest” to illustrate the selection process in consciousness.

7. Consciousness and Autonomy: Boden (1995: 157) notes that conscious thoughts are less relevant to our autonomy than we tend to believe, with some neuroscientists doubting whether conscious intentions actually direct behaviour. Libet’s (2004) experiments provide evidence that neural activity associated with decision-making precedes the awareness of that decision.