Anthropomorphism is the practice of ascribing human properties to non-humans. Whether or not such an ascription is anthropomorphic, therefore, crucially depends on whether or not the property being ascribed is exclusively human. However, with regard to living entities, the evolution of species means that all organisms and the properties ascribed to them are evolved variants of one another, having differentiated from a common source. On this basis, behavioural properties ascribable to humans are differentiated variants of properties ascribable to other animal species, and so are hyponyms (“daughters”) of superordinate (“parent”) categories that transcend synchronic species boundaries. The more differentiated the species being compared, the more generalised the superordinate category, and the greater the distance between it and its hyponyms.
To claim that certain traits are exclusively human is to ignore all the graduated evolutionary steps that link species down the generations, and maintain the
anthropocentric perspective culturally inherited from ancestral models. Complaints of anthropomorphism, sometimes couched in terms of respecting the “dignity” of
other species, actually betray the fear of (the “indignity” of) being
like other species, and so, betray such fears as not being a separate, unique, special creation, as being determined robotic mechanisms, as not surviving death, and so on. The more undervalued the other species, the more intense may be the fear (and the denial of it).
[1]
Footnote:
[1] There is the fear that human life might be as unimportant as some consider the lives of other species to be.
ChatGPT revised:
Anthropomorphism is the practice of ascribing human properties to non-humans. Whether or not a given ascription is anthropomorphic, therefore, depends crucially on whether the property being ascribed is exclusively human.
However, when the ascription is made to living entities, this assumption becomes problematic. Given that all organisms have evolved from common ancestors, the behavioural properties observed across species are differentiated variants of one another. That is, properties ascribable to humans are hyponyms (“daughters”) of more general (“parent”) categories that transcend synchronic species boundaries. The greater the evolutionary divergence between the species being compared, the more generalised the shared superordinate category — and the greater the conceptual distance between it and its specialised variants.
To claim that certain traits are exclusively human is to ignore the graduated evolutionary pathways that link species across generations. Such claims preserve an anthropocentric perspective inherited from ancestral models — models shaped by cultural fears and desires.
Complaints of anthropomorphism, even when framed as a form of respect for the “dignity” of other species, often betray a deeper fear: the fear of the indignity of resemblance. That is, the fear of not being a separate, special creation; the fear of being determined, robotic mechanisms; the fear of not surviving death. The more undervalued the other species, the more intense the fear — and the more emphatic the denial.¹
¹ There is the fear that human life might be as unimportant as some consider the lives of other species to be.