46. Mind As Brain Process

The thoughts themselves are the thinker. 

William James 

One of many[1] impediments to modelling the mind in an ideationally consistent way is the simple fact that the word ‘mind’, like ‘fire’ and ‘life’, is a noun. Nouns construe experience as things, whether concrete or abstract.[2] Construing fire, life and mind as things entails construing them as composed as substances. In failing to detect the substances of fire and life, ideationally-consistent models emerged only when they were instead construed as processes. In failing to detect the substance of mind, the substance has been construed as immaterial, and so beyond the range of empirical scientific modelling.[3]

An alternative way to model mind, with the promise of doing so in an ideationally consistent way, is to construe it as a process. This is to construe the brain as the material medium of the “mind” process, and the mind as a function of the brain as physiological system, in the same way that digestion is a function of the alimentary canal as physiological system. However, the brain alone is insufficient to understand the process labelled ‘mind’ if the brain functions as an evolutionary system which adapts to the rest of the body and to the contextual environment in which the body is required to function. Further, the contextual environment to which brain functions adapt includes other bodies whose behaviours express the potentials of brains embedded within them, and through which brain functions adapt to one another. 

Footnotes:

[1] Another impediment to modelling the mind in an ideationally consistent way is the high interpersonal value placed on surviving death.

[2] Nouns that are obviously derived from verbs, such as ‘formation’, construe a process as the congruent construal, but words like ‘fire’, ‘life’ and ‘mind’ display no hint of such a construal.

[3] This construal of mind is largely consistent with the religious notion of soul.

ChatGPT revised:

“The thoughts themselves are the thinker.” — William James

One of the key challenges in modelling the mind in an ideationally consistent way is the fact that the word “mind,” like “fire” and “life,” is a noun. Nouns construe experience as things, whether concrete or abstract. By treating fire, life, and mind as things, we implicitly treat them as substances. However, fire and life are not substances in the traditional sense. Ideationally consistent models only emerged when these concepts were reframed as processes rather than substances. Similarly, the failure to recognize the substance of mind has led to the misconception of it as immaterial, placing it beyond the reach of empirical scientific modelling.

An alternative and ideationally consistent approach to modelling the mind is to treat it as a process. In this model, the brain serves as the material medium for the “mind” process, and the mind itself is understood as a function of the brain, much like digestion is a function of the alimentary canal. However, the brain alone is insufficient to explain the mind. The brain functions as part of an evolutionary system that adapts not only to the rest of the body but also to the contextual environment in which the body must function. Furthermore, the contextual environment to which the brain adapts includes other bodies whose behaviours express the potentials of brains embedded within them, and through these interactions, brain functions adapt to one another.

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Footnotes:

1. Impediments to Modelling the Mind: Another challenge to modelling the mind ideationally is the significant interpersonal value placed on surviving death. This creates psychological and social pressures that influence how the mind is conceptualized.

2. Nouns Derived from Verbs: Nouns that are clearly derived from verbs, such as “formation,” are typically construed as processes. However, words like “fire,” “life,” and “mind” do not inherently suggest such a process-based interpretation, which complicates our understanding of them.

3. Mind as Soul: The traditional view of the mind as immaterial is often aligned with the religious concept of the soul, a notion that remains largely resistant to empirical modelling.