In cases where human traits are acknowledged to be variants of traits shared with other animal species, the human variant is sometimes used as the standard by which to assess the non-human version. This practice can be understood as an example of (human) interpersonal consistency — but interspecies inconsistency — overriding ideational consistency, as will be explained below.
(1) Ideational Inconsistencies
To judge nonhuman traits by comparing them with the human version is to privilege the human and ignore the fact that each variant has evolved because it has been of value to the species in question in the context in which it has had to function. What has been of value in the evolution of humans may not have been of value in the evolution of another species, and what has been of value in the evolution of another species may not have been of value in the evolution of humans.
If the traits in question are defined narrowly enough, so as to refer only to the variant specific to humans — privileging the human variant as the standard — then demonstrating that another species lacks the human-specific trait is merely (and trivially) demonstrating that it is not human. An example of this is demonstrating that another species lacks (human) language — instead of investigating language and the communicative interactions of other species as comparable variants of the more inclusive category of social-semiotic systems.
(2) Interspecies Inconsistencies: Separatism And Triumphalism
The interpersonal function of assessing other species by criteria thought to be uniquely definitive of humanity, such as by reference to the human version of semiosis or intelligence
[1], is to demarcate a boundary between humans and other species, and so to separate ‘them’ from ‘us’ and ‘us’ from ‘them’, continuing a regional lineage of ancestral modelling that evolved in the Bronze Age, or before.
Demonstrating the inability
[2] of other species to perform acts of evolutionary value to humans but not to the species in question has the interpersonal function of judging the other species to be inferior to humans
[3] (because they are not human), and so, judging that humans are superior to other species (because we are human).
[4]
This triumphalism is the interspecies variant of intraspecies racism (“they are inferior because they are not us”) and nationalism (“we are superior because we are us”). It is no accident that the measure of intelligence is a strategy common to both versions of the practice: the interspecies and intraspecies varieties. The dismissal of the value of the semiosis of other animal species by humans is the interspecies version of the dismissal of the value of the languages of indigenous people — “jabbering” — by the people invading them, stealing their land and destroying their livelihood.
Footnotes:
[1] The identification of‘intelligent’ with ‘human’ is demonstrated by the self-selected species name: Homo sapiens sapiens.
[2] Note also the potential modality error of mistaking (dis)inclination for (in)ability. Conditioning experiments demonstrate the importance of motivation for behaviour, and alert us to what we interpret as a matter of ability in other species may instead be a matter of inclination.
[3] Consider the quickness of humans to delimit the possibilities of other species, in the absence of any evidence whatsoever, including all the false claims about other species — eg no brain lateralisation, no tool use, no toolmaking — based only on preconceived assumptions.
[4] This species “cheerleading” might be seen as evidence of the interpersonal damage caused by the proposition that humans are animals of this world, rather than eternal beings of some imagined one.
ChatGPT revised:
In cases where human traits are acknowledged as variants of traits shared with other species, the human variant is often treated as the standard by which to assess the non-human version. This practice can be understood as an instance of (human) interpersonal consistency — but interspecies inconsistency — overriding ideational consistency, as explored below.
(1) Ideational Inconsistencies
To judge non-human traits by reference to the human version is to privilege the human and ignore the evolutionary contexts in which other traits have developed. Each variant has evolved because it was functional and valuable to the species in question, within its specific ecological and social niche. What has been advantageous in human evolution may be irrelevant — or even maladaptive — in the evolution of another species, and vice versa.
When traits are defined narrowly enough to apply only to the human variant — privileging the human as the standard — then demonstrating their absence in other species amounts to a tautology: simply proving that another species is not human. A paradigmatic example is demonstrating that another species lacks (human) language, rather than investigating language and communicative behaviour across species as differentiated realisations of the broader category of social-semiotic systems.
(2) Interspecies Inconsistencies: Separatism and Triumphalism
The interpersonal function of evaluating other species in terms of human-specific traits — such as the human version of semiosis or intelligence¹ — is to mark a boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’. This continues a regional lineage of ancestral modelling, evolved during the Bronze Age or earlier, in which humans are construed as exceptional.
Proving the inability² of other species to perform acts of evolutionary value to humans — but not to the species in question — functions interpersonally to judge other species as inferior (because they are not human), and thereby judge humans as superior (because we are).³ ⁴
This triumphalism is the interspecies analogue of intraspecies racism (“they are inferior because they are not us”) and nationalism (“we are superior because we are us”). That the measure of intelligence is a key instrument in both reflects a common strategy. The dismissal of animal semiosis by humans is the interspecies version of the dismissal of indigenous languages as “jabbering” — a rhetorical move often accompanying invasion, land theft, and cultural destruction.
¹ The identification of ‘intelligent’ with ‘human’ is enshrined in the self-selected species name: Homo sapiens sapiens.
² Note the potential modality error of mistaking (dis)inclination for (in)ability. Conditioning experiments demonstrate the importance of motivation in behaviour, and caution us that what we interpret as inability in other species may, in fact, be a matter of inclination.
³ Consider the eagerness of humans to delimit the capacities of other species without evidence, including numerous now-debunked claims — e.g., no brain lateralisation, no tool use, no toolmaking — all based on anthropocentric assumptions.
⁴ This kind of species “cheerleading” may be read as a symptom of interpersonal damage: the damage wrought by the proposition that humans are animals of this world, rather than eternal beings of some imagined one.