A model is not just an ideational construal of categorisable experience. Each construal involves, to various degrees, specific (interpersonal) values, rather than others, and specific (textual) foci of attention, rather than others. Because of this, arguing to influence the selection of models also involves the assessment of both the consistency of the values of the model with the values held by the potential users, and the consistency of the attentions emphasised in the model with what the potential users regard as deserving attention.
Selection for interpersonally consistent values can result in an ideationally consistent model being rejected by potential users who judge it to be of negative interpersonal value — that is, to be inconsistent with the values they judge positively. For example, in the sciences, those who value reductionism or determinism negatively, especially with regard to modelling aspects of humanity, will be motivated to reject any model they judge to be reductionistic or deterministic. However, because arguments against scientific models are ostensibly required to be couched in terms of ideational meaning, the (interpersonal) motivation for the argument, and the (interpersonal) value at the nub of the dispute, will often be left unstated.
On the other hand, selection for interpersonally consistent values can result in an ideationally inconsistent model being selected by potential users who judge it to be of positive interpersonal value — that is, to be consistent with the values they judge positively. If such judgements are made by practitioners of high standing in the particular field, the probability that others will also select the model is increased, since it increases the certainty (confidence) in the model in the community. In extreme cases, where the interpersonal values of a specific model are thought to depend fundamentally on the ideational construal, the model will be held dogmatically.
Selection for textually consistent foci of attention can be exemplified by the oscillation in Western philosophy and science between emphasising the rôle of the mind (reason) in modelling, as in the rationalism of Descartes, and emphasising the rôle of the body (senses) in modelling, as in the empiricism of Locke. Different foci of attention in different ideational construals are also likely to be associated with different interpersonal values. This can be exemplified by the different values associated with focussing on either ‘Nature’ or ‘Nurture’ in modelling behaviour. This further enables the
rejection of ideationally
consistent models and the
selection of ideationally
inconsistent models.
[1]
The evolutionary direction of ideational construals and textual attentions is thus guided by interpersonal values; the evolutionary direction of ideational construals and interpersonal values is guided by textual attentions; the evolutionary direction of interpersonal values and textual attentions is guided by ideational construals.
Footnote:
[1] Note that metafunctional consistency as a selection principle explains why demonstrably false models of phenomena arise and are maintained, even amongst those who value the scientific method.
ChatGPT revised:
A model is not just an ideational construal of categorisable experience. Each construal also involves, to varying degrees, specific interpersonal values over others, and specific textual foci of attention over others. Because of this, arguments aimed at influencing the selection of models must also engage with how consistent a model’s values are with those of potential users, and how aligned its focus of attention is with what those users regard as salient.
Interpersonal consistency can lead to the rejection of an ideationally consistent model by users who judge it to be of negative interpersonal value — that is, inconsistent with the values they hold positively. In the sciences, for example, those who view reductionism or determinism as ethically or politically problematic, particularly when modelling aspects of humanity, may be motivated to reject any model they construe as reductionistic or deterministic. However, because scientific arguments are ostensibly required to be couched in ideational terms, such interpersonal motivations often go unstated, even though they are central to the dispute.
Conversely, interpersonal consistency can lead to the selection of an ideationally inconsistent model by users who see it as embodying values they support. If such judgements are made by influential figures in a field, they can increase the certainty of others in the model, thereby increasing its uptake. In extreme cases, where the interpersonal values of a model are seen as inseparable from its ideational construal, the model may be held dogmatically.
Textual consistency can also play a decisive role. This is illustrated by the historical oscillation in Western thought between prioritising mind (as in Cartesian rationalism) and prioritising body (as in Lockean empiricism). Shifts in textual focus are often entangled with interpersonal values, as seen in the long-standing debate over ‘Nature’ versus ‘Nurture’ in behavioural science — where attention to one or the other becomes aligned with particular ideological or moral commitments. In such cases, even ideationally consistent models may be rejected, and ideationally inconsistent ones embraced, on textual or interpersonal grounds.[1]
The evolutionary trajectory of ideational construals and textual attentions is guided by interpersonal values;
the trajectory of ideational construals and interpersonal values is guided by textual attentions;
and the trajectory of interpersonal values and textual attentions is guided by ideational construals.
Footnote:
[1] This principle of metafunctional consistency helps explain why demonstrably false models not only arise but persist, even among those who profess commitment to the scientific method.