Immunity to Determinism in Biological Theory
The fear that biological theory might “reveal” that humans and human behaviour are “really” determined — merely effects of prior causes — has prompted substantial resistance within the biological sciences. Yet attempts to align biological construals with a desire for self-determination often come at the cost of ideational consistency, as outlined below.
(1) Genes as Determiners vs. Ecology as Liberator
When genes are construed as agents — as external causes of human processes — this potentially threatens the belief that individuals are the agents of their own “destinies.” Such construals may therefore trigger what amounts to an immune response in those who hold self-determination as an interpersonal value. These immune responses may be interpersonal, ideational, or textual (a matter of focus). An interpersonal response targets the proponents of genetic determinism. An ideational response attempts to identify logical or conceptual inconsistencies in genetic accounts. A textual response shifts attention away from genes and towards other factors, such as ecological influences.
This last strategy often involves emphasising ecology while downplaying genetics. However, it conveniently ignores that ecology can also be construed as deterministic — as evidenced, for example, by the consistent responses of organisms to shared environmental conditions.[¹] The shift from genes to environment thus often reflects not an escape from determinism, but a redirection of explanatory threat.
(2) Selection as Determiner vs. Variation as Liberator
The ideological war against determinism is also evident in construals of evolutionary processes. Selection and adaptation, easily modelled as simple cause-and-effect relations, serve as the new bogeys. By contrast, variation offers a comforting refuge, appearing less rule-bound and more capricious. Once again, immune responses can be interpersonal, ideational, or textual. An interpersonal response involves attacking those who promote a selection-centred view. An ideational response may involve disputing that all evolutionary change is adaptive. A textual response shifts focus away from selection and adaptation and toward variation.
However, this move again overlooks the potential determinism of the favoured alternative. Variation, though random in its adaptive consequences, is itself caused — chemically and physically determined at the molecular level. What appears as contingency at one scale remains causality at another.
Footnote:
[1] Compare, for example, the defensive reactions to Skinnerian Behaviourism, which similarly located causality in external conditions rather than internal agency.