As with mind, one impediment to modelling consciousness in an ideationally consistent way is the simple fact that the word ‘consciousness’ is a noun — in this case a noun derived from an adjective.[1] This construes it as an abstract thing: a property or state of an entity. Again, an alternative way to model consciousness, with the promise of doing so in an ideationally consistent way, is to construe it as a process. But, whereas ‘mind’ refers to the totality of processes mediated by the brain, ‘consciousness’ only refers to some of those processes.
As a process, consciousness can be understood as the moment by moment focused recognition of current recognition activity: a monitoring of the system by the system.[2] The recursive nature of the process means that this recognition of the current recognition processes can itself be what is being recognised by the system from moment to moment. This allows not only the monitoring of current experiencing, including remembering and imagining, but also metamonitoring: monitoring of the monitoring process itself.
The complexity of consciousness correlates with the complexity of the systems being recognised in the process.[3] That is, consciousness involves the monitoring of different types of recognition processes, rather than different types of monitoring.[4] Some of the dimensions of this complexity have been sketched in previous chapters, but a few can be recapitulated here.
(1) the number of functional levels in the neurological system as recognition system: the perceptual recognition of sensory difference and the supervenient conceptual recognition of such perceptual differences.
(2) the differentiation of these levels of organisation into types of behavioural potentials: non-semiotic and semiotic (linguistic and non-linguistic).
(3) the differentiation of these types into context-specific registers.[5]
(4) the three timescales of semiotic processes: logogenesis, ontogenesis and phylogenesis.
(5) the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes: each moment involves the selection[6] of some activations, the valeur of which depends on the contrastive options not selected, and the sequencing of choices is nonlinear, such that small differences in starting positions can lead to disproportional differences in trajectories and endpoints.
(6) the metafunctional dimensions of semiotic dynamics: the (textual) grading, focusing and directing of attention to the (ideational) construals motivated by (interpersonal) values.
Because consciousness is a monitoring process, it is not the decision maker of behaviour.[7] Decisions — selections — are made by the whole system, which includes the process of consciousness, in context. Consciousness is the monitoring of the choosing process, and it potentially provides feedback to the system as a whole, altering the probabilities of future selection events. Conscious decisions are decisions that are monitored in the process of consciousness; they are not selected by consciousness. Consciousness does not make decisions. This is demonstrated by the experiments of Libet (2004) that show that the neural events of decision-making occur before the subject is aware of the decision being made.
Footnotes:
[1] Grammatically, ‘consciousness’ might be seen as a nominalisation of the clause ‘being conscious’.
[2] So-called ‘loss of consciousness’ can be either the cessation of the monitoring process, as in blindsight, or the cessation of the processes being monitored, as in the cessation of visual perception during sleep.
[3] This follows from the Jamesian insight that consciousness involves both the process and the phenomenon.
[4] That is, the Jamesian notion of ‘types of conscious states’ is re-formulated here as ‘consciousness of types of states’.
[5] There is also the positions of each individual in the multiple webs of interconnectivity in the hierarchical organisation of social systems which correlates with which registers an individual has access to. This will be discussed under ‘person’, below.
[6] Denton (1993: 6):
Henry James, the distinguished American writer, expressed the view concerning exercise of options as ‘mind being a theatre of simultaneous possibilities — the selection of some and suppression of the rest’…
[7] Boden (1995: 157) cites evidence that conscious thoughts are less relevant to our autonomy than we think, and notes neuroscientists’ doubts as to whether conscious intentions actually direct behaviour. The experiments of Libet (2004) demonstrate that neural activity associated with a decision precedes awareness of the decision.