The experiments of Libet (2004), which showed that neural activity associated with a decision precedes awareness of the decision, have been widely interpreted as challenging the notion of free will. The covert assumption here is that consciousness equates with the self or person, and so if the person is the chooser, then consciousness is the chooser. But the capacity to choose does not depend on consciousness doing the choosing. As argued here, it is more ideationally consistent to say that it is the whole system in context that chooses. Consciousness is the monitoring of a small subset of the selecting. Consciousness and decision-making are distinct phenomena, and ‘unconscious’ decisions are decisions nonetheless.
The values that have motivated humans to see consciousness as the agent of behaviour, as the controller rather than as the monitoring of personal experience, include the desire to see individual humans as self-determined, and the complementary fear that humans might be more determined rather than determining.
This fear came to the fore in the rejection of
Behaviourism, the construal of ‘externally observable behavioural responses as functions of environmental stimuli’, with ‘mental states either ignored or redefined in stimulus–response terms’.
[1] In the 1930s and 1940s, the experiments of Skinner demonstrated how rewards and punishments shape behaviour, challenging the notion of free will.
[2] As Boden (1995: 149) put it, Skinner’s behaviourism implied that “the environment”, not “autonomous man” is in control (Skinner 1971: 21). By contrast, the model of behaviour presented here locates the rôle of reward and punishment within a larger perspective of choice and biological–semiotic co-evolution, elucidating some of the dimensions excluded by behaviourist models.
The unqualified belief that humans
[3] have the “power” to choose freely serves an interpersonal function. By construing individuals as agents of their own behaviour, it fixes moral responsibility with the individual. On the one hand, this contributes to social stability, since agents of disorder can be identified and removed from society. But, on the other hand, it blames unequal individuals equally, and absolves the community from being responsible for those who “choose” to fail.
Footnotes:
[1] Macquarie Dictionary (1992: 157).
[2] See, for example, Slater (2004).
[3] Legal systems typically qualify this to adults “of sound mind”.
ChatGPT revised:
The Problem of Free Will and the Influence of Consciousness
The experiments of Libet (2004), which demonstrated that neural activity associated with a decision precedes awareness of the decision, have often been interpreted as challenging the notion of free will. The covert assumption here is that consciousness equates with the self or person. In this view, if the person is the chooser, then consciousness is the chooser. However, the capacity to choose does not rely on consciousness performing the act of choosing. As argued here, it is more ideationally consistent to say that it is the whole system in context that chooses, and that consciousness merely monitors a small subset of that selecting process. Consciousness and decision-making are distinct phenomena, and unconscious decisions are still decisions.
The values motivating the perception of consciousness as the agent of behaviour — as the controller rather than as the monitor of personal experience — stem from the desire to see humans as self-determined, and the complementary fear that humans might instead be more determined than determining.
This fear surfaced prominently with the rejection of Behaviourism, which viewed externally observable behavioural responses as functions of environmental stimuli, with mental states either ignored or redefined in stimulus–response terms (Macquarie Dictionary, 1992). In the 1930s and 1940s, Skinner’s experiments demonstrated how rewards and punishments shape behaviour, challenging the idea of free will. As Boden (1995: 149) noted, Skinner’s behaviourism implied that “the environment,” not “autonomous man,” is in control (Skinner, 1971: 21). By contrast, the model of behaviour presented here locates the role of rewards and punishments within a broader context of choice and biological–semiotic co-evolution, addressing some dimensions excluded by behaviourist models.
The unqualified belief that humans possess the “power” to choose freely serves an interpersonal function. By portraying individuals as the agents of their own behaviour, this belief fixes moral responsibility with the individual. On one hand, this contributes to social stability, as agents of disorder can be identified and removed from society. On the other hand, it places the blame equally on individuals for their failures, absolving the broader community from responsibility for those who “choose” to fail.