Because the selection of a model is the usage of that model, any action that affects the probability that a specific model will be used or discarded amounts to selection pressure in the evolution of models. Selection pressure can be understood in terms of varying proportions of modulation and modalisation.
At the modulation end of this scale, potential users are more or less
obliged by others to use one model in preference to another.
[1] This may depend on the power relations between the obligators and the obligated, but the obligation can come from solidarity pressures within a community of peers as well as from those with the greater — for example: institutional — authority. Such models are at risk of becoming dogmas.
At the modalisation end of this scale, in communities where individuals are free to choose, the varying uncertainty of potential users towards the range of models on offer makes the choice of model usage negotiable, arguable. In this case, the action taken is to increase or decrease the certainty of others with regard to specific models. The means of doing so ranges from providing evidence
[2] consistent with the model, such as interpretations of experimental results, to the rich panorama of fallacious argumentation. These include, for example, what Dennett (1993: 401) refers to as
Philosopher’s Syndrome: mistaking a failure of imagination for an insight into necessity
[3] (‘I can’t imagine how x could be, therefore y must be true’), what Dawkins (1995: 70) refers to as the
Argument From Personal Incredulity (‘I can’t believe x, therefore y must be true’), and the multiply various explicit and implicit forms of
Argumentum Ad Hominem (attacking the person instead of critiquing the argument).
[4]
Footnotes:
[1] My certainty (modalisation) is your obligation (modulation).
[2] When belief without evidence is valued, it is termed ‘faith’; when it is not valued, it is termed ‘credulity’.
[3] An example of Philosopher’s Syndrome in the field of linguistics is the so-called ‘poverty of the stimulus’ argument intended to “justify” the simplistic (Platonist) claim that language must be “innate”.
[4] The well-documented list of these seems endless, but another family of arguments that exploit user uncertainty in relation to models that deserves mention here involves the subtle shift from semiotic consistency-as-arbiter (see further in the text) to “I am the arbiter of the evidence you find”.
ChatGPT revised:
By persuading others we convince ourselves.
— Junius
Because the selection of a model is its use, any action that affects the probability a specific model will be used or discarded amounts to selection pressure in the evolution of models. Such pressure can be understood in terms of varying proportions of modulation and modalisation.
At the modulation end of the scale, potential users are more or less obliged by others to use one model in preference to another.[1] This obligation may arise from power relations between the obligators and the obligated, but it can also stem from solidarity pressures within a peer community, not just institutional authority. Models under such pressure are at risk of becoming dogmas.
At the modalisation end of the scale — in communities where individuals are free to choose — the variable uncertainty of potential users toward the range of available models renders model selection negotiable. In this context, the action taken is to increase or decrease the certainty of others toward specific models. This persuasion may involve providing evidence[2] consistent with the model — such as interpretations of experimental results — or drawing from the rich panorama of fallacious argumentation.
Among the more notable fallacies are:
-
What Dennett (1993: 401) calls Philosopher’s Syndrome: mistaking a failure of imagination for an insight into necessity[3] ("I can’t imagine how x could be, therefore y must be true");
-
What Dawkins (1995: 70) terms the Argument from Personal Incredulity ("I can’t believe x, therefore y must be true");
-
And the ever-present Argumentum ad Hominem, in its many explicit and implicit forms — attacking the person rather than addressing the argument.[4]
Footnotes:
[1] My certainty (modalisation) is your obligation (modulation).
[2] When belief without evidence is valued, it’s called faith; when it is not valued, it’s called credulity.
[3] A familiar example of Philosopher’s Syndrome in linguistics is the so-called poverty of the stimulus argument — often deployed to justify the simplistic (Platonist) claim that language must be innate.
[4] Another family of arguments that exploits user uncertainty deserves mention: those that shift the arbiter from semiotic consistency (see later discussion) to “I am the arbiter of the evidence you find.”