One aspect of “truth”[1] is consistency in meaning-making, and given the metafunctional dimensions of meaning-making, this entails metafunctional consistency in meaning-making: experiential, logical, interpersonal and textual.[2] To be ideationally consistent in meaning-making is to be consistent both in the representation of experience and in the logical relations said to obtain between representations of experience.[3] To be interpersonally consistent in meaning-making is to be consistent in the values given to — the stance taken on — ideational meanings. To be textually consistent in meaning-making is to be consistent in what is attended to as relevant with regard to ideational and interpersonal meanings. Different consistencies — including tensions between construals of experience, values inherent in construals, and attentions paid to construals — creates diversity in modelling.
Footnotes:
[1] The word ‘truth’ is a noun formed from the adjective ‘true’, which construes it metaphorically as an abstract thing in itself rather than congruently as a description of relations between things.
[2] From interpersonal and textual perspectives, ideational distinctions are a means of elaborating what is valued and focussed upon.
[3] The word ‘real’ is often used to mean ideationally true, but it is often also extended to mean that the specific categorisations of the description exist as properties of the perceivable, independent of the modelling framework.