63. Physics: Mathematics As Lens

Mathematics[1] is a semiotic field in which quantities — as descriptions of categorisables — can be related to each other quantitatively. Equations are symbolic re-presentations of identifying clauses in which quantities function as mutually-identifying participants, each an elaboration of the other. The process of deriving a solution involves the sequential elaboration of equivalent clauses until the value of the unknown token is identified. 

As a lens for physics, mathematics provides a univariate means (quantity) of testing ideational consistency between and within models — the “hardest” of tests, providing the greatest certainty. As a lens, it also provides symmetry[2], as embodied in the equation, as an organising principle of description, even to the extent that the modelled and the model are conceived as if two sides of an equation. Importantly, the two sides of an equation — token and value — are of different orders of experience, token lower, value higher. In this case, the categorisable form that is modelled, ‘being’, is the (lower order) token, and the functional model, ‘describing’, is the (higher order) value. 

Arising from this experiential asymmetry, an ideational inconsistency in the interpretation of the epistemological status of mathematics has had an influence on interpretations in physics. Many mathematicians reify their semiotic system as a transcendent ‘reality’, as an abstract thing existing in a Platonic realm. For example, Ruelle (1993: 161;165) writes: 

But mathematicians have no doubt that there is a mathematical reality beyond our puny existence. We discover mathematical truth, we do not create it…But mathematicians and physicists know they deal with a reality that has laws of its own… 

That is, the phylogenetic expandability of the semiotic system of mathematical potential, in ideationally consistent ways by mathematicians, is equated with the “discovery” of “real” properties that “exist” independently. But it is not ideationally consistent to construe mathematical discoveries as objects with eternal existence; mathematical discoveries are system-internal consistencies in a resource for quantitatively modelling the categorisable. 

The view, widely-held in the mathematical community, that ‘mathematics would exist even if mathematicians did not’ (Coveney & Highfield 1995: 24) reflects this reification, and makes the category error of confusing ‘potential existence’ with ‘existence’.[3]

Footnotes:

[1] Mathematics is usefully distinguished from metamathematics: in which mathematics is used to model mathematics itself, in the same way that linguistics is metalanguage: language is used to model language itself.

[2] All fields have their own aesthetic values (appreciation probabilities), and symmetry is of very high value in the field of mathematics.

[3] The ‘many universes’ hypothesis might be seen as an example of the same category error, of confusing ‘potential existence’ with ‘existence’; in this case, other possible trajectories of this universe are construed as other existing universes.

ChatGPT revised:

The Reification of Mathematics

Mathematics[1] is a semiotic field in which quantities — as descriptions of categorisables — are related to one another quantitatively. Equations symbolically re-present identifying clauses, in which quantities function as mutually identifying participants: each an elaboration of the other. The process of deriving a solution involves the stepwise elaboration of equivalent identifying clauses until the value of the unknown token is specified.

As a lens for physics, mathematics offers a univariate means — quantity — of testing ideational consistency both within and between models. It is, in this sense, the “hardest” of tests: the one that confers the greatest epistemological certainty. It also brings with it a powerful organising principle — symmetry[2] — as embodied in the structure of the equation. In fact, the modelled (token) and the model (value) are often conceived as if they are two sides of an equation. Crucially, however, these two sides are of different orders of experience: the token belongs to a lower order, the value to a higher. That is, the categorisable form being modelled — being — is the lower-order token, while the functional model — describing — is the higher-order value.

From this experiential asymmetry arises a persistent ideational inconsistency — one that has deeply shaped epistemological interpretations in physics. Many mathematicians reify their semiotic system as a transcendent reality — an abstract realm of ideal entities existing independently of the human observer. For instance, Ruelle (1993: 161, 165) writes:

But mathematicians have no doubt that there is a mathematical reality beyond our puny existence. We discover mathematical truth, we do not create it… But mathematicians and physicists know they deal with a reality that has laws of its own…

Here, the phylogenetic expandability of the mathematical system — its capacity to be extended consistently by users — is conflated with the “discovery” of intrinsic properties that pre-exist that activity. But it is ideationally inconsistent to construe such “discoveries” as existing objects. They are not eternal entities; they are system-internal consistencies — relations within a semiotic resource for modelling the categorisable.

The widespread view that “mathematics would exist even if mathematicians did not” (Coveney & Highfield 1995: 24) exemplifies this reification. It conflates potential existence (as meaning potential) with actual existence (as instantiated meaning).[3]

---

Notes

1. Mathematics is usefully distinguished from metamathematics, just as language is from linguistics: in metamathematics, mathematics is used to model mathematics itself; in linguistics, language is used to model language itself.

2. Every semiotic field values certain kinds of patterning. In mathematics, symmetry has particularly high appreciation value.

3. The “many universes” hypothesis may be seen as a similar category error — confusing potential with instance. In that case, alternative trajectories of this universe are construed as parallel universes already instantiated.

62. Language Choices Create Worldviews

You know, we really do agree. It’s just that you say it wrong![1]

By way of introduction, consider nominal groups such as ‘my body’, ‘my brain’, ‘my mind’ and so on. Each of these distinguishes two entities: the entity referenced by the Deictic (possessive adjective) ‘my’, and the entity realised as Thing in each instance: ‘body’, ‘brain’ and ‘mind’. In this way, everyday language construes the language user as distinct from the biological organism, the organs and the processes that are the sine qua non of the language user — when these cease to function, so does the language user — and it is a short step to construing the language user, in the manner of Plato and Descartes, as consisting of a distinct essence or nonmaterial substance (see further below). 

But this is not a phenomenon confined only to the language of non-specialists. Consider the following clauses spoken by a professor[2] of physics: ‘thoughts travel through the conscious mind… entered into consciousness… travelled through the mind to the mouth’. Leaving aside the fact that the speaker has identified thoughts with electro-chemical differences propagating along nerve fibres, the prepositional phrases ‘through the conscious mind’, ‘into consciousness’ and ‘through the mind’ realise locations involving entities — as realised by the nominal groups: ‘the conscious mind’, ‘consciousness’ and ‘the mind’.[3] Even if these locations and entities are interpreted as abstract (grammatically metaphorical), rather than concrete (grammatically congruent), such instances can similarly lead easily to the construal of the conscious mind/consciousness/the mind as nonmaterial substance. 

In the grammar of the clause, phenomenal experience is construed as a process involving one or more participants, with possible attendant circumstances. Participants in processes are congruently realised by nominal groups, or metaphorically realised by nominalisations. Nominalisations may be lexical, as exemplified by the verb ‘think’ being rendered as the abstract noun ‘thought’, or grammatical, as exemplified by the clause ‘the physicist thought’ being rendered as the nominal group ‘the thinking of the physicist’.[4]

Lexical nominalisations are generally the harder of the two to recognise, especially when their metaphorical status is not signalled by word morphology, as by suffixes like ‘ation’, ‘ness’, ‘ity’, and so on. In the history of ideas, however, taking nouns at face value has been the source of major misconstruals. As mentioned in a previous chapter, the nouns ‘fire’ and ‘life’, for example, construed the phenomena they categorised as things, and much energy was spent trying to determine the substances that composed them, or the essences that characterised them, until the phenomena they categorised were eventually reconstrued as processes.[5]

Footnotes:

[1] Scientist quoted in Dawkins (2004: 506).

[2] Paul Davies speaking on The Science Show 27/8/04 (ABC Radio National). He also asked rhetorically: ‘how can a thought move an arm?’

[3] Typical in this regard are these instances spoken by science journalist Natasha Mitchell on The Science Show 27/8/04 (ABC Radio National): ‘…look into the brain and find consciousness there’; and on All In The Mind 4/9/04 (ABC Radio National): (for people in comas) ‘where does consciousness go?’

[4] For the motivations for nominalisation and its functions, see Halliday (1985b: 72-4).

[5] Like fire and life, heat also used to be thought a substance (a fluid), and so: a thing, but it is now thought to be the random motion of atoms, and so: a process. [Bronowski Ascent of Man: World Within World].

ChatGPT revised:

You know, we really do agree. It’s just that you say it wrong![1]

To begin this chapter on implications, consider nominal groups such as my body, my brain, and my mind. Each construes two entities: the referent of the possessive Deictic my, and the Thing that follows — body, brain, mind. In this way, everyday language distinguishes the language user from the biological organism, its organs, and even its processes — despite the fact that when these cease to function, so does the language user. From this grammatical separation, it is a short step to a metaphysical one: construing the language user as a distinct essence or nonmaterial substance, in the manner of Plato or Descartes (as we’ll explore further below).

But this is not merely a feature of ‘folk’ language. Consider the following clauses, spoken by a professor[2] of physics: “thoughts travel through the conscious mind… entered into consciousness… travelled through the mind to the mouth.” Leaving aside the fact that this speaker has identified thoughts with electrochemical signals propagating along nerve fibres, these prepositional phrases — through the conscious mind, into consciousness, through the mind — construe locations realised by nominal groups: the conscious mind, consciousness, the mind.[3] Even if such locations are interpreted abstractly (as grammatical metaphor), rather than concretely (as congruent with material processes), they still invite the construal of mind or consciousness as a nonmaterial substance.

In the grammar of the clause, phenomenal experience is construed as a process involving one or more participants, with optional attendant circumstances. Participants in processes are congruently realised by nominal groups, or metaphorically realised through nominalisation. Nominalisation may be lexical, as when the verb think is rendered as the noun thought, or grammatical, as when the clause the physicist thought is rendered as the nominal group the thinking of the physicist.[4]

Lexical nominalisations are often harder to recognise, especially when their metaphorical status is not signalled by derivational morphology — as with suffixes like -ation, -ness, or -ity. But in the history of ideas, taking such nouns at face value has led to profound misconstruals. As noted earlier, the nouns fire and life construed the phenomena they categorised as things, and much energy was spent trying to determine their substance or essence — until these were eventually reconceived as processes.[5]

66. General Relativity

Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity construes space and time as the dimensions of the universe: space-time is the frame of reference, a four-dimensional grid, in which events occur.[1] This is quite different from everyday speech, where ‘space’ is often used to refer to the absence of visible matter (in space-time), and ‘time’ is often used to refer to processes or events (in space-time), as when linear processes or cyclical processes are referred to as ‘linear time’ or ‘cyclical time’, respectively, or when sequences of events are referred to as the ‘flow of time’.[2] The crucial difference, in terms of the present discussion, is this: the everyday usage construes space and time as phenomena that are experienced, whereas Relativity construes space-time as the frame of reference in which phenomena are experienced. Time and space are construed as the reference system against which events are measured, events that include the categorising processes of experiencing organisms. 

Footnotes:

[1] According to the Uncertainty Principle of Quantum Physics, it is not possible to measure both the momentum (mass x velocity) and the position of a particle. Momentum can be construed as a measurement with regard to matter-energy, while position can be construed as a measurement with regard to space-time, the frame of reference. A quantum matter-energy field (of difference) conforms to the wave model as a measure of momentum (relative to other matter-energy), and to the particle model as a measure of position (relative to space-time).

[2] To say that the universe — in some sense — “already exists” from the big bang to its heat death is to confuse time (as a dimension) with the unfolding of events.

ChatGPT revised:

Reference System vs Experienced Phenomena

Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity construes space and time as the dimensions of the universe: space-time is a four-dimensional reference system — a continuum — within which events are located.[1] This construal differs significantly from everyday usage, in which ‘space’ often refers to the absence of visible matter, and ‘time’ refers to processes or sequences of events. For example, people speak of ‘linear time’ or ‘cyclical time’ to describe types of process, or of the ‘flow of time’ to describe the unfolding of events.[2]

The crucial distinction, for present purposes, lies in how space and time are being construed. In everyday language, space and time are phenomena that are experienced — construed experientially. In Relativity, by contrast, space-time is the system of reference against which phenomena — including experiences — are measured.

In other words, while common construals position space and time within experience, Relativity positions experience within space-time. Events are located with respect to this four-dimensional grid — including the events involved in categorising, observing, and experiencing. Time and space, in this model, are not things that flow or recur or are “filled” with content — they are the coordinates in which content is positioned and measured.

---

Notes

[1] According to the Uncertainty Principle in quantum physics, it is not possible to measure both the momentum (mass × velocity) and the position of a particle with absolute precision. Momentum can be construed as a measure relative to matter-energy, while position can be construed as a measure relative to space-time — the reference frame. A quantum field of difference conforms to the wave model when measured in terms of momentum (relative to matter-energy), and to the particle model when measured in terms of position (relative to space-time).

[2] To say that the universe “already exists” from the big bang to its heat death is to confuse time as a dimension with the unfolding of events. The dimension of time does not imply the existence of an event at every coordinate until such events are actualised — instantiated — in experience.

65. Quantum Mechanics

but if I wasn't here documenting the story

would that mean that the plot did not exist?

Oh, would it not be absurd if there was no objective state?

What if the unobserved always waits, insubstantial,

till our eyes give it shape?[1]

The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, proposed by Bohr, maintains, inter alia, that an entity is not “real” until it is observed by a conscious observer. This has lead to widely-held belief in physics that: 

In quantum theory physical reality is dependent on the observer and hence on human consciousness.[2]

This view derives from not distinguishing the domain of categorisable phenomena from the domain of categories created by observers in the process of categorising. If this distinction is recognised, then the Copenhagen interpretation becomes (less mysteriously): a phenomenon is not categorised until observed. It is not that physical reality is dependent on the observer, but that the categorisation of perceivable phenomena is dependent on the categorising process. The categorial identity of a phenomenon — of perceivable difference — requires interaction with a categorising system.[3]

The belief in the notion of nonlocality derives from the findings of multiply replicated experiments since Aspect (1982) which demonstrate that a property of one particle can depend on a property of another. If the particles in question are photons moving away from each other at the speed of light after a collision, then it is thought that there are only two alternative explanations: either there must be faster-than-light signalling between the particles, or the particles must be connected in some way. Since faster-than-light signalling is ruled out by the theory of Relativity, and would introduce a host of logical paradoxes, it is claimed that the experiment demonstrates that the notion that reality is separable into distinct localities is false — at least at the most fundamental level of the quantum. 

If the distinction is made between the domain of categorisable phenomena and the domain of categories, then such experiments can, instead, be understood as demonstrating findings about the categorisation process. For example, the experiments demonstrate that, at the most fundamental level known, tested by the most rigorous methods known, categories are relative: mutually dependent, mutually defining. Further, the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics might be taken to suggest that the domain of phenomena, of perceivable difference, has zones of uncategorisability, or of unresolvability.[4] That is, it may suggest that some phenomena, at least, are not categorisable until observed. 

Footnotes:

[1] Peter Hammill Our Eyes Give It Shape from Singularity (2007).

[2] Robinson (2005: 120).

[3] That is, a value is related to a phenomenal token by a categorising system, where each value is the carrier of one or more attributes (an instance of one or more categorial types).

[4] At least with known methods of detection and categorisation.

ChatGPT revised:

Our Eyes Give It Shape

but if I wasn't here documenting the story
would that mean that the plot did not exist?
Oh, would it not be absurd if there was no objective state?
What if the unobserved always waits, insubstantial,
till our eyes give it shape?
— Peter Hammill, Our Eyes Give It Shape (2007)

The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, associated with Bohr, maintains — among other things — that an entity is not “real” until it is observed by a conscious observer. This has led to a widespread belief in physics that:

In quantum theory, physical reality is dependent on the observer and hence on human consciousness.[2]

This interpretation arises from a failure to distinguish between two domains: (i) the domain of categorisable phenomena — that is, perceivable difference — and (ii) the domain of categories constructed by observers in the act of categorising. If this distinction is made, the Copenhagen interpretation becomes less metaphysically troubling: not that physical reality depends on observers, but that categorisation — the attribution of type or value — does. A phenomenon is not categorised until it is observed.

That is, the categorial identity of a phenomenon — its identification as an instance of a type — requires interaction with a categorising system.[3] Observation is the act by which potential categorial values are collapsed into actual instances.

A similar confusion surrounds the interpretation of quantum nonlocality. Since the Aspect experiments (1982), it has been accepted that the value attributed to one particle can depend on the value attributed to another, even when the particles are spatially separated. If the two particles are photons moving apart at the speed of light following a collision, then only two explanations appear possible: either (a) faster-than-light signalling is occurring, or (b) the particles remain connected in some way. As (a) would violate Relativity and introduce paradox, (b) is taken to mean that reality is nonlocal — that separability is an illusion, at least at the quantum level.

But again, if we distinguish the domain of categorisable phenomena from the domain of categories, an alternative understanding emerges. These experiments can be understood as demonstrating constraints not on phenomena per se, but on the process of categorisation. Specifically, they show that at the most fundamental level tested, categories are relative — mutually defined, mutually dependent.

Further, the Copenhagen interpretation might be understood to imply that the domain of perceivable difference includes zones of uncategorisability — or at least zones where categorisation remains unresolved until interaction occurs.[4] Some phenomena, in other words, may not be categorisable — may not instantiate a value — until observed.

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Notes

[1] Peter Hammill, Our Eyes Give It Shape, from Singularity (2007).

[2] Robinson (2005: 120).

[3] That is, a value is related to a phenomenal token by a categorising system, where each value is the carrier of one or more attributes — an instance of one or more categorial types.

[4] That is, with current methods of detection and categorisation.

64. The Epistemological Status Of The ‘Laws’ Of Physics

The epistemological status of the ‘laws’ of physics can be usefully examined in terms of the interpersonal system of modality, in which modalisation is distinguished from modulation. Modalisation covers probability and usuality, whereas modulation covers obligation and inclination. Congruently, the ‘laws’ of physics are propositions — held with very high values of certainty — that describe phenomena in terms of very high values of modalisation: probabilities/usualities. If these probability/usuality descriptions are deemed to be laws in the sense that the universe obeys them, then such a construal is (interpersonally) metaphorical — and needs to be unpacked to avoid misunderstanding — since modalisation is reinterpreted (misinterpreted) as modulation: obligation.[1] A description of phenomena is re-presented as a prescription for phenomena; statements that describe are re-presented as commands that are obeyed.[2]

Mistaking this metaphor for a congruent rendering can lead to ideationally inconsistent claims about the epistemological status of the ‘laws’ of physics, two of which can be identified here. As already discussed, one stance is to equate (mathematically ‘=’) the ‘laws’ of physics with the categorisable phenomena being described. The model and the modelled are one and the same, with one copy “out there in the observable world” and another copy “in the heads of physicists”. This leads to such confusions as being amazed that humans can understand the universe[3] — whereas understanding, modelling in the pursuit of consistency, is a process that humans, as animals with neurological recognition systems, undergo. 

The other ideationally inconsistent stance proceeds from the view that ‘the physical laws govern the universe’. The view here is that the (abstract) physical laws, as governors, transcend the (material) universe they govern.[4] This can result in the physical laws being located in an idealised and unobservable — and so: unscientific — Platonic realm, and, since the physical laws are both outside the universe and in control of it, it can also entail a sort of deification of the laws, since they both occupy the position, and perform the functions, ancestrally ascribed to gods.[5]

Footnotes:

[1] Note that (interpersonal) obligatory modulation (x must y) corresponds to (experientially) a passive causative process (x is required to y). See Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 523).

[2] This metaphor also pervades mathematics, the major tool for physics, where ‘consistently describable by numbers’ is interpreted as ‘governed by numbers’. For example, in his The Ascent Of Man, Bronowski says:

Pythagoras proved that the world of sound is governed by exact numbers, and he went on to prove that the same thing is true of the world of vision. 

[3] This applies to mathematics as much as physics. For example, Ruelle (1993: 161): 

We do not understand why the world of mathematical truth is accessible to us.

[4] Similarly, before General Relativity, it was also thought that time and space transcend the universe, in the sense that the universe is “in” space and time, rather than space-time being the dimensions of the universe.

[5] Einstein’s ‘God (the laws of physics) does not play dice’ criticism of quantum mechanics.

ChatGPT revised:

The Reification of Physical Laws

The epistemological status of the so-called laws of physics can be usefully clarified in terms of the interpersonal system of modality, in which modalisation (probability, usuality) is distinguished from modulation (obligation, inclination). Congruently, the laws of physics are best understood as propositions — descriptions held with high interpersonal certainty — in which the experiential content is construed with very high degrees of modalisation: high probabilities or high usualities.

However, when such descriptions are taken as laws in the sense that the universe obeys them, the construal becomes metaphorical — specifically, interpersonally metaphorical — and this metaphor needs to be unpacked to avoid epistemological confusion. In this reinterpretation, modalisation is misread as modulation, i.e., as obligation.[1] A description of what usually or probably happens is re-presented as a command that must be followed.[2] The clause type has not changed — it remains a proposition — but its interpersonal meaning has: the indicative statement has been metaphorised as if it were an imperative.

Mistaking this metaphor for a congruent rendering leads to ideational inconsistencies about the epistemological status of the laws of physics. Two such inconsistencies are especially prominent.

The first equates the laws of physics with the phenomena they describe. Here, the model and the modelled are treated as one and the same — with one copy “out there” in the observable world and another copy “in the heads of physicists.” This leads to an apparently profound, but ultimately misplaced, sense of wonder: that humans are somehow able to understand the universe.[3] But understanding is not a miracle. It is a function of recognition — the brain’s capacity to build consistent models of experience.

The second inconsistent stance takes the metaphor at face value: that the physical laws govern the universe. This assigns to the laws a governing role that transcends the phenomena they describe. Abstract relations, which are part of the modelling system, are projected into a transcendent realm beyond the material universe — effectively a Platonic heaven of pure form.[4] Since these laws are imagined as both outside the universe and in control of it, they inherit the role of deity — occupying the same explanatory niche that gods once filled.[5]

---

Notes

1. Obligatory modulation (e.g. x must y) is congruent with the experiential clause type of passive causation (e.g. x is required to y). See Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 523).

2. This metaphor also pervades mathematics, physics’s primary modelling tool. Descriptions such as “consistently describable by numbers” are reinterpreted as “governed by numbers.” For example, Bronowski writes:

Pythagoras proved that the world of sound is governed by exact numbers, and he went on to prove that the same thing is true of the world of vision.

3. This confusion extends to mathematics. As Ruelle (1993: 161) puts it:

We do not understand why the world of mathematical truth is accessible to us.

4. Before General Relativity, time and space were similarly construed as transcendent — with the universe seen as being “in” space and time, rather than space-time being the dimensions of the universe itself.

5. For example, Einstein’s famous metaphor: God (the laws of physics) does not play dice — a personification of the laws as a rational agent rejecting randomness.

68. Anthropic Reasoning

(1) The Weak And Strong Anthropic Principles 

As Dawkins (2006: 135), for example, points out, the term ‘anthropic principle’ was coined in 1974 by Brandon Carter, and expanded by John Barrow and Frank Tipler (1988).[1] Carter’s point is that the very fact that humans exist is informative about the universe: it places restrictions on what the universe can look like (an argument from effects to causes). The weak and strong versions of the principle are outlined by Hawking (1988: 124-5) as follows: 

The weak anthropic principle states that in a universe that is large or infinite in space and/or time, the conditions necessary for the development of intelligent life will be met only in certain regions that are limited in space and time. The intelligent beings in this area should therefore not be surprised if they observe that their locality in the universe satisfies conditions that are necessary for their existence. 

…According to [the strong anthropic principle], there are either many different universes or many different regions of a single universe, each with its own initial configuration and, perhaps, with its own set of laws of science. In most of these universes the conditions would not be right for the development of complicated organisms; only in the few universes that are like ours would intelligent beings develop and ask the question: “Why is the universe the way we see it?” The answer is simple: if it had been different, we would not be here! 

The Anthropic Principles are attempts to explain why the fundamental constants of physics are “coincidentally” just those required for the emergence of (intelligent) life; that is, to explain why, of all the potential universes that could exist, the one that physicists know exists happens to be just right for the emergence of beings capable of understanding it.[2] However, the directions that Anthropic reasoning has taken involves a number of ideational inconsistencies, both experiential and logical, motivated by interpersonal values, and facilitated by epistemological confusions, as explained below. 

(2) Ideational Inconsistencies 

Some anthropic reasoning confuses result and reason: science models intelligent life as an effect (cause: result) of the initial conditions and subsequent dynamics of the universe (cause: reason). Anthropic reasoning posits that the reason is caused by the result. That is, intelligent life, as an outcome of the fundamental constants is reinterpreted as the reason for the fundamental constants.

Some anthropic reasoning goes further and confuses result and purpose: intelligent life, as an outcome (cause: result) of the fundamental constants is reinterpreted as the objective (cause: purpose) of the fundamental constants. Note that to attribute purpose to the universe in this way is to model it as if it were an organism; it is to map models of purposeful behaviour onto models of the evolution of entire cosmos. 

(3) Interpersonal Motivations 

By reinterpreting intelligent life as the reason and purpose of the fundamental constants, rather than one of myriad results, anthropic reasoning attempts to reinterpret the contingent existence of humans (modalisation: probability) as a necessary inevitability (modulation: obligation). The interpersonal function of this is to ascribe high value to humans: humans are very special, very important, the whole point of the universe.

Given that virtually everything else in the universe would not have emerged if the values of the fundamental constants were different, anthropic reasoning assumes the judgement (by humans) that the process of modelling the universe (by humans) is of higher value than all other processes going on in the universe.

(4) Epistemological Confusion

This special valuing of the process of modelling the universe is facilitated by the epistemological confusion, outlined earlier, whereby some physicists use the notion of the mathematical equation as their model for understanding the the process of modelling the categorisable, such that the physical universe constitutes one half of the equation, and the theoretical model constitutes the other half. Finding the ultimate truth, on this view, is a matter of finding the model that is in perfect symmetry with the “real” world (a world that contains “true” categories independent of categorising systems). 

It is because of this epistemological model that some physicists, following Einstein, are amazed that humans have the “good fortune” to be able to understand the universe (equated with the laws of physics). Unless it is just a coincidence, humans must be the most important entities in the universe. A less self-aggrandising — and more ideationally consistent — interpretation is that humans can only create models that humans are capable of understanding. 

(5) The Participatory Anthropic Principle 

Other Anthropic principles[3] have also been proposed, and one that can be mentioned here is the Participatory Anthropic Principle (Wheeler 1983), according to which all existents — past, present, and future — are brought into existence by acts of observation by all the observers that have ever existed. Again, this type of reasoning derives from not distinguishing the domain of categorisable phenomena from the domain of categories created by observers in the process of categorising. If this distinction is recognised, then the Participatory Anthropic Principle becomes: categorisable phenomena are not categorised until observed. It is models of the universe that are created by humans and function for humans, not the categorisable universe itself. 

Footnotes:

[1] Carter now regards ‘cognizability principle’ a more appropriate term for what he had in mind (Dawkins 2006: 392), which more directly reflects the amazement by mathematicians that the universe is understandable (as mentioned earlier in this discussion).

[2] It might be argued that anthropic reasoning has become the physical equivalent of William Paley’s theological Argument From Design, invoking a (mathematical) designer that transcends the universe itself; perhaps a case of mathematical physicists seeing God in their own image.

[3] According to the Final Anthropic Principle (Tipler 1989), intelligent life must come into existence in the universe, and once it comes into existence it will continue to exist until the end of time.

ChatGPT revised:

The Anthropic Principles: Ideational, Interpersonal, and Epistemological Dimensions

(1) The Weak and Strong Anthropic Principles

As Dawkins (2006: 135) notes, the term anthropic principle was coined by Brandon Carter in 1974 and further developed by John Barrow and Frank Tipler (1988).[1] Carter’s basic claim is that the very fact of human existence provides information about the nature of the universe: it places constraints on what the universe must be like — an argument that proceeds from effect to cause.

Hawking (1988: 124–5) distinguishes the weak and strong versions of the principle:

The weak anthropic principle states that in a universe large or infinite in space and/or time, the conditions necessary for the development of intelligent life will only occur in certain regions, limited in space and time. Intelligent beings in such regions should not be surprised to observe that their local conditions happen to support their existence.

The strong anthropic principle proposes that there are either many different universes or many different regions of a single universe, each with its own initial configuration and possibly its own laws of science. In most of these, conditions would not support complex organisms; only in the few universes like ours would intelligent beings evolve and ask: “Why is the universe the way we see it?” The answer: if it were different, we wouldn’t be here.

Both versions attempt to account for the apparent “coincidence” that the fundamental constants of physics are exactly those needed for the emergence of intelligent life — that is, to explain why, out of all possible universes, the one known to physicists is precisely suited for beings capable of understanding it.[2] However, as explored below, anthropic reasoning often involves a series of ideational inconsistencies, interpersonal motivations, and epistemological confusions.

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(2) Ideational Inconsistencies

Some forms of anthropic reasoning confuse result with reason: science models intelligent life as an effect of the universe’s initial conditions and dynamics. Anthropic reasoning, however, reverses this logic — treating intelligent life as the reason for those conditions.

More strongly still, some versions confuse result with purpose: intelligent life, as an outcome of specific physical conditions, is reinterpreted as the goal or objective of those conditions. This attribution of purpose to the universe models it as if it were an organism — mapping models of purposeful human behaviour onto models of cosmic evolution.

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(3) Interpersonal Motivations

By reframing intelligent life as the reason or purpose of the fundamental constants — rather than as one among countless possible outcomes — anthropic reasoning reinterprets the contingent existence of humans (modalisation: probability) as a necessary inevitability (modulation: obligation).

This shift serves an interpersonal function: it elevates the status of humans, implying that we are not only significant but central — the point of the universe.

Given that nearly everything else in the universe would not have emerged under different constants, anthropic reasoning smuggles in the judgement (by humans) that the human activity of modelling the universe is more valuable than all the other processes in the universe.

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(4) Epistemological Confusion

This special valuation of modelling is sustained by an epistemological confusion discussed earlier: namely, the assumption — prevalent in some physics discourse — that the mathematical equation is not just a model of categorisation, but a mirror of reality. On this view, the physical universe forms one side of an equation, while the theoretical model forms the other. The task of science becomes the search for a perfectly symmetrical match — a “true” model of a “real” world, whose categories exist independently of categorising systems.

This is the context in which some physicists, following Einstein, express wonder at the “good fortune” that humans are able to understand the universe (equated with the laws of physics). If this is not mere coincidence, then — the reasoning goes — humans must be of special significance.

A less self-aggrandising — and more ideationally consistent — interpretation is simply this: humans can only construct models that humans are capable of understanding.

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(5) The Participatory Anthropic Principle

Other versions of the anthropic principle have also been proposed. One example is the Participatory Anthropic Principle (Wheeler 1983), which claims that all existents — past, present, and future — are brought into being through acts of observation by all observers who have ever existed.

This view again rests on a failure to distinguish between categorisable phenomena and the categories constructed by observers. Once this distinction is recognised, the Participatory Anthropic Principle can be reframed: phenomena are not categorised until observed. What humans create are not universes, but models of the universe — models that function for humans, not the universe itself.

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Notes

[1] Carter has since suggested that the term cognizability principle more accurately captures what he intended (Dawkins 2006: 392), namely the astonishment of physicists that the universe is intelligible at all.

[2] It could be argued that anthropic reasoning is the physical analogue of William Paley’s Argument from Design, invoking a (mathematical) designer that transcends the universe — a case of mathematical physicists seeing God in their own image.

[3] For example, the Final Anthropic Principle (Tipler 1989) claims that intelligent life must arise in the universe, and, once arisen, must persist until the end of time.

67. A “Theory Of Everything”

The search for a physical “Theory of Everything”, a model in which gravity is described in terms that are mathematically (ideationally) consistent with the other fundamental forces — the electromagnetic, strong nuclear and weak nuclear forces — is an attempt to unify descriptions, not only of different scales, but also of a different order. This is because the other fundamental forces, as construed by Quantum Theory, describe relations between particles of matter, as effected through an exchange of particles, whereas gravity, on the other hand, as construed by General Relativity, describes a relation between matter and its frame of reference, space-time[1], which then has consequences for other particles of matter.[2] The attempt to describe gravity in Quantum physical terms, as effected through an exchange of particles — hypothetical gravitons — is an attempt to model gravity as a direct relation between particles.

Footnotes:

[1] Physicists routinely conceptualise the frame of reference, space-time, as if it were material — as, for example, when the term ‘fabric’ of space-time is used.

[2] The fact that both photons and the gravitational effects of matter travel at the speed of light suggests that this speed is a limit of the frame of reference, space-time.

ChatGPT revised:

The ‘Theory of Everything’ and the Orders of Description

The search for a physical “Theory of Everything” — a unified model in which gravity is described in terms that are mathematically (i.e., ideationally) consistent with the other fundamental forces — is an attempt to unify not only descriptions across different scales, but across different orders of construal.

The electromagnetic, strong nuclear, and weak nuclear forces, as modelled by Quantum Theory, describe interactions between particles of matter, mediated through the exchange of particles. These are force-carrier particles — such as photons for the electromagnetic force — that operate within space-time.

Gravity, by contrast, as modelled by General Relativity, describes a relation between matter and its frame of reference, namely space-time itself.[1] That is, matter alters the structure of the coordinate system in which it is embedded — and this alteration, in turn, affects the behaviour of other matter.[2]

The attempt to describe gravity in quantum terms — for example, by hypothesising the existence of gravitons — is thus an attempt to reconstrue gravity as a direct particle-to-particle interaction, rather than a relation between matter and its reference frame. This amounts to modelling gravity at a different order: translating a relational structure (between matter and space-time) into a causal structure (between particles).

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Notes

[1] This reference frame is routinely metaphorised as if it were material — for example, in the common phrase ‘fabric of space-time’. This metaphor implicitly relocates space-time from the order of measurement into the order of matter, potentially obscuring its function as a system of reference.

[2] The fact that both photons and gravitational effects propagate at the speed of light suggests that this speed is not merely a property of matter, but a limit imposed by the structure of space-time itself — the frame of reference within which all physical phenomena are located.

70. Construals Of Causation In Biology

Construals of causation in the biological sciences can be usefully examined in terms of the logico-semantic relation of cause — reason, result and purpose — on the one hand, and in terms of the ergative function of agency — participant as cause — on the other. 

(1) Cause: Reason, Result And Purpose 

One source of ideational inconsistency in biology is the failure to distinguish different types of causal relations: reason, result and purpose.[1] Reason and result can be generalised as because reason P so result Q, whereas purpose can be generalised as because intention P so action Q. 

A frequent example of reason and result being construed as purpose can be generalised as phenotypic trait X evolved in order to Y; for instance, eyes evolved in order to improve animals survival prospects. An alternative construal, one that is ideationally consistent with evolutionary theory, would be phenotypic trait X evolved because Y: eyes evolved because they improved animals survival prospects. 

A similar case is the construal of evolutionary reason and result as behavioural purpose, which can be schematised as animal X does Y in order to pass on its genes. An alternative construal, one that is ideationally consistent with evolutionary theory, would be animal X doing Y can result in its genes being passed on. Animals do not act in order to propagate their genes. Rather, animals act in order to achieve multifarious ends across a range of multifarious contexts, and some of these actions can result in the propagation of their genes. 

The distinction between reason and result and purpose is not a trivial one, epistemologically, and deep ideational consistencies can follow from the failure to make it. These can range from misunderstandings of the respective rôles of variation and selection, and the relation between the two, to the belief that “the purpose” of organisms is the passing on of genes. Note, incidentally, that this is ideationally distinct from organisms being a means by which genes replicate themselves, or genes being the means by which organisms reproduce themselves, both of which are instances of manner rather than cause. 

(2) Cause As Participant: Agency 

In terms of ergativity, an agent is a participant that is the external cause of a process, while a medium is a participant through which a process is actualised. As participants in evolutionary processes, genes are the medium of variation and selection processes, not the agent of variation and selection processes. Genes are the participants through which variation and selection are actualised; they are not the external causes of variation and selection. Construing genes as agents of evolution is ideationally inconsistent with biological theory.[2]

Incidentally, it might be added here that construing biological taxa as the agents of their own evolution, as in clauses like amphibians evolved eardrums or humans evolved big brains is similarly ideationally inconsistent with biological theory.[3] Biological taxa are the media through which evolutionary change is actualised. 

As participants in developmental processes, genes function as both agent and medium in cycles of expressing and activating. That is, genes are the external cause of amino acid formation, for example, but the chemical environment is the external cause of the selective activation of genes in that process. 

Similarly, to construe genes as self-replicators[4] is to construe them as the agents of their own replication, whereas they are the medium through which the replication is actualised. The external cause, the agent of gene replication, is the chemical environment that either initiates the process or maintains the status quo. 

Footnotes:

[1] It is also useful to distinguish ‘purpose’ from the more general notion of ‘telos’, or ‘ends’. Previously established processes, such as those of biological development, have ends that the system in question moves towards. This is a more general meaning than ‘purpose’, which might be best rstricted to describing behaviours directed at satisfying value disequilibria. That is, development has ends, behaviour has ends that are purposes, and evolution, being open and contingent, has neither purpose nor ends.

[2] Construing selection metaphorically as the agent of evolution conceals the congruent agent causing the selecting.

[3] Typical, not only in science journalism, is the following, which combines ‘species as the agent of evolution’ with ‘evolution as purposeful’: ‘Dr Brennan believes [mallard] females evolved convoluted oviducts to foil the male rapists.’ [Maggie Fox, Reuters, SMH 2/5/07]

[4] Note also the Agentive suffix –or.

ChatGPT revised:

Construals of Causation in the Biological Sciences

Causal construals in the biological sciences can be productively analysed in terms of two distinct yet complementary systems: the logico-semantic relation of cause — encompassing reason, result, and purpose — and the ergative structure of agency, in which a participant functions as the cause of a process.

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(1) Cause: Reason, Result, and Purpose

One persistent source of ideational inconsistency in biology is the failure to distinguish between different types of causal relation:

• Reason: because P, so Q

• Result: P, so Q

• Purpose: because intention P, so action Q

A common conflation occurs when reason and result are construed as purpose — e.g. trait X evolved in order to Y, such as eyes evolved in order to improve survival. This construal attributes purpose to evolution, when the ideationally consistent alternative is eyes evolved because they improved survival prospects — a result, not a purpose.

A similar misstep occurs when evolutionary result is reinterpreted as behavioural purpose — e.g. animal X does Y in order to pass on its genes. This frames gene propagation as an intended goal. But a more accurate construal is: animal X doing Y can result in its genes being passed on. Animals act for a range of immediate purposes; some of these may have the downstream result of gene propagation.

The distinction is epistemologically significant. The conflation of result with purpose underwrites widespread misconceptions — from confusion over the roles of variation and selection, to the belief that organisms exist in order to pass on their genes. Notably, this differs from construing organisms as the means by which genes replicate themselves, or vice versa — which are instances of manner, not cause.

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(2) Cause as Participant: Agency

In ergative terms, an agent is the external cause of a process, while a medium is the participant through which the process unfolds. Within evolutionary processes, genes are media, not agents. They are the participants through which variation and selection are actualised — not the external causes of those processes. To construe genes as the agents of evolution is therefore ideationally inconsistent with biological theory.[²]

Similarly, to construe biological taxa as agents of their own evolution — e.g. amphibians evolved eardrums, humans evolved big brains — is equally inconsistent. Taxa are media, not agents, of evolutionary change.[³]

In developmental processes, by contrast, genes may function both as agent and medium in recursive cycles of expression and activation. Genes may be the external cause of, for example, amino acid formation. But the chemical environment is the agent of selective gene activation — determining which genes are expressed and when.

Finally, construing genes as self-replicators implies they are agents of their own replication. But in congruent terms, genes are the medium of replication; the agent is the chemical environment that initiates and sustains the replication process. This is further signalled by the agentive suffix -or, as in replicator.[⁴]

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Footnotes:

[1] It is useful to distinguish purpose from the broader notion of telos or ends. Developmental processes have ends — states the system tends towards. Purpose, however, might be best restricted to behaviour aimed at resolving value disequilibria. Development has ends; behaviour has purposeful ends; evolution, being open and contingent, has neither ends nor purpose.

[2] Treating selection metaphorically as an agent of evolution conceals the congruent agent that causes the selecting.

[3] For example: “Dr Brennan believes [mallard] females evolved convoluted oviducts to foil the male rapists” (Maggie Fox, Reuters, Sydney Morning Herald, 2/5/07). This conflates species-as-agent with evolution-as-purposeful.

[4] Note the semantic significance of the agentive suffix –or.

69. Fear Of Causation In Biology: The War Against Determinism

The fear that biological theory might “reveal” that humans and human behaviour are “really” determined — “merely” the effects of causes — has motivated considerable debate in the biological community. However, being consistent with the desire not to be determined can put the ideational consistency of construals at risk, as outlined below. 

(1) Genetics As Determining Vs Ecology As Freeing 

Construing genes as agents, as the external cause of human processes, potentially threatens the the belief that individuals have the power of self-determination, the belief that individuals are agents (responsible for) their own “destinies”. So it has the potential to trigger an immune response in those who hold this interpersonal value. The responses may be interpersonal, ideational and/or textual (focus of attention). An interpersonal response involves attacking espousers of the view. An ideational response identifies the ideational inconsistencies in any claim that genes are the causes of human processes. A ‘focus of attention’ response gives more importance to other factors than to genes. This can mean emphasising the importance of ecology, for example, and downplaying the importance of genes. However, this involves conveniently ignoring the possibility of also construing the ecological dimension as deterministic, as suggested, for example, by the similarity of responses across individuals to the same enviromental stimuli.[1] But doing so provides a comforting refuge from the threat posed by genetic determinism. 

(2) Selection As Determining Vs Variation As Freeing 

The war against determinism is also fought in the construal of evolutionary processes. Here the bogeys are selection and adaptation, which are easily construed as simple cause and effect, and the comforting refuge is variation, which might be seen as more capricious. Again the immune responses may be interpersonal, ideational and/or textual. An interpersonal response involves attacking espousers of the view. An example of an ideational response is disputing that all evolutionary change is adaptive. An example of a ‘focus of attention’ response is downplaying the importance of selection and adaptation and emphasising the importance of variation. Again, this involves conveniently ignoring the possibility of also construing variation as deterministic, for, while variation is random at the biological level in terms of adaptiveness, at the molecular level, it is the direct result of chemical causes. 

Footnote:

[1] Note also the immune responses to the Behaviourism proposed by Skinner and colleagues.

ChatGPT revised:

Immunity to Determinism in Biological Theory

The fear that biological theory might “reveal” that humans and human behaviour are “really” determined — merely effects of prior causes — has prompted substantial resistance within the biological sciences. Yet attempts to align biological construals with a desire for self-determination often come at the cost of ideational consistency, as outlined below.

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(1) Genes as Determiners vs. Ecology as Liberator

When genes are construed as agents — as external causes of human processes — this potentially threatens the belief that individuals are the agents of their own “destinies.” Such construals may therefore trigger what amounts to an immune response in those who hold self-determination as an interpersonal value. These immune responses may be interpersonal, ideational, or textual (a matter of focus). An interpersonal response targets the proponents of genetic determinism. An ideational response attempts to identify logical or conceptual inconsistencies in genetic accounts. A textual response shifts attention away from genes and towards other factors, such as ecological influences.

This last strategy often involves emphasising ecology while downplaying genetics. However, it conveniently ignores that ecology can also be construed as deterministic — as evidenced, for example, by the consistent responses of organisms to shared environmental conditions.[¹] The shift from genes to environment thus often reflects not an escape from determinism, but a redirection of explanatory threat.

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(2) Selection as Determiner vs. Variation as Liberator

The ideological war against determinism is also evident in construals of evolutionary processes. Selection and adaptation, easily modelled as simple cause-and-effect relations, serve as the new bogeys. By contrast, variation offers a comforting refuge, appearing less rule-bound and more capricious. Once again, immune responses can be interpersonal, ideational, or textual. An interpersonal response involves attacking those who promote a selection-centred view. An ideational response may involve disputing that all evolutionary change is adaptive. A textual response shifts focus away from selection and adaptation and toward variation.

However, this move again overlooks the potential determinism of the favoured alternative. Variation, though random in its adaptive consequences, is itself caused — chemically and physically determined at the molecular level. What appears as contingency at one scale remains causality at another.

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Footnote:

[1] Compare, for example, the defensive reactions to Skinnerian Behaviourism, which similarly located causality in external conditions rather than internal agency.