Fear Of Causation In Biology: The War Against Determinism

The fear that biological theory might “reveal” that humans and human behaviour are “really” determined — “merely” the effects of causes — has motivated considerable debate in the biological community. However, being consistent with the desire not to be determined can put the ideational consistency of construals at risk, as outlined below. 


(1) Genetics As Determining Vs Ecology As Freeing 

Construing genes as agents, as the external cause of human processes, potentially threatens the the belief that individuals have the power of self-determination, the belief that individuals are agents (responsible for) their own “destinies”. So it has the potential to trigger an immune response in those who hold this interpersonal value. The responses may be interpersonal, ideational and/or textual (focus of attention). An interpersonal response involves attacking espousers of the view. An ideational response identifies the ideational inconsistencies in any claim that genes are the causes of human processes. A ‘focus of attention’ response gives more importance to other factors than to genes. This can mean emphasising the importance of ecology, for example, and downplaying the importance of genes. However, this involves conveniently ignoring the possibility of also construing the ecological dimension as deterministic, as suggested, for example, by the similarity of responses across individuals to the same enviromental stimuli.[1] But doing so provides a comforting refuge from the threat posed by genetic determinism. 


(2) Selection As Determining Vs Variation As Freeing 

The war against determinism is also fought in the construal of evolutionary processes. Here the bogeys are selection and adaptation, which are easily construed as simple cause and effect, and the comforting refuge is variation, which might be seen as more capricious. Again the immune responses may be interpersonal, ideational and/or textual. An interpersonal response involves attacking espousers of the view. An example of an ideational response is disputing that all evolutionary change is adaptive. An example of a ‘focus of attention’ response is downplaying the importance of selection and adaptation and emphasising the importance of variation. Again, this involves conveniently ignoring the possibility of also construing variation as deterministic, for, while variation is random at the biological level in terms of adaptiveness, at the molecular level, it is the direct result of chemical causes. 


Footnote:

[1] Note also the immune responses to the Behaviourism proposed by Skinner and colleagues.