61. Semiotic Interactions With Other Animals

In considering semiotic interactions between humans and other animal species, it might be noted that the humans involved must value the animal behaviour as meaningful in order to categorise it that way, in the same way that the ontogenesis of human meaning potential involves parents valuing the babbling of infants as meaningful. The ontogenesis of meaning potential in each individual depends on interactants assuming that the individual is capable of behaving semiotically. Experiments that defy other animals to prove that they are behaving semiotically are therefore both ideationally inconsistent, and interpersonally inconsistent across species. 

Researchers studying nonhuman semiosis are sometimes dismissed as being too engaged with their subjects to be “objective”. A more ideationally consistent reaction would be to take the engagement of the researchers as just the sort of thing that would be expected to occur in interspecies semiosis. This engagement manifests itself, for example, in the use of so-called ‘caregiver’ language — which includes the use of “exaggerated” pitch ranges — that parents typically use with their infants. So, although the caregiver language that mediates between the semiotic systems of different species is potentially (ideationally) informative about the semiosis being accommodated, it is instead used (interpersonally) as evidence that the researchers are deluded. What is informative is to actually model the semiotic systems of other species. 

If the world is teeming with richly experiencing interactive animals, rather than mere determined robots, then the more genuinely informative research is research which both 

(1) focuses on what other animals can do, including behaviours beyond the range of humans and appropriate to the life they have evolved to lead, rather than what they can’t do, and 

(2) produces (ideationally consistent) models, while being aware of both 

(a) human species-specific values that bias the creation of models that glorify humans at the expense of other species, and 

(b) the danger of imposing human limitations in recognising the abilities of other species onto them as their limitations.

ChatGPT revises:

In considering semiotic interactions between humans and other animal species, it is worth noting that the humans involved must value the animal behaviour as meaningful in order to categorise it as such — just as, in human ontogenesis, parents must value infant babbling as meaningful for it to develop into language. The ontogenesis of meaning potential in any individual depends on interactants assuming that the individual is capable of semiotic behaviour.

Experiments that require other animals to prove they are behaving semiotically are therefore both ideationally and interpersonally inconsistent across species. Such demands violate the same interpersonal assumptions that enable human meaning-making to develop in the first place.

Researchers who study non-human semiosis are sometimes dismissed as too emotionally engaged with their subjects to be “objective.” But a more ideationally consistent interpretation would take such engagement to be exactly what we should expect in interspecies semiosis. This engagement is often evident in the use of so-called caregiver language — such as exaggerated pitch ranges — analogous to the register parents use with infants. While such language may offer valuable ideational insight into how human semiotic systems adapt to accommodate those of other species, it is instead typically interpreted interpersonally as evidence that the researcher is deluded.

What is actually informative is the attempt to model the semiotic systems of other species.

If the world is teeming with richly experiencing, interactive animals — rather than mere determined robots — then the more genuinely informative research is research that:

1. Focuses on what other animals can do, including behaviours beyond the range of humans and appropriate to the lives they have evolved to lead, rather than on what they cannot do; and

2. Produces ideationally consistent models, while being critically aware of:

   a. the human-specific values that bias models in ways that glorify humans at the expense of other species; and

   b. the risk of projecting human limitations in recognising the capacities of other species onto those species, as if those were their own limitations.